Re: [PATCHv3] random: Make /dev/random wait for crng_ready

On 2/17/19 9:44 AM, Bernd Edlinger wrote: > > + if (crng_ready() && !blocking_pool.initialized && After some more debugging I realize that blocking_pool.initialized is true after 128 bits of input entropy, but that is only 80 bits credited, due to the asymptotic 3/4 crediting formula

[PATCHv3] random: Make /dev/random wait for crng_ready

Reading from /dev/random may return data while the getrandom syscall is still blocking. Those bytes are not yet cryptographically secure. The first byte from /dev/random can have as little as 8 bits entropy estimation. Once a read blocks, it will block until /proc/sys/kernel/random/read_wakeup_t