On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 06:12:23PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> +void unprotected_firmware_begin(void)
> +{
> + if (firmware_ibrs) {
> + __disable_indirect_speculation();
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * rmb prevent unwanted speculation when we
> + * a
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 06:12:23PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> From: David Woodhouse
>
> We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
> but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
>
> Si
From: David Woodhouse
We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with retpoline
but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
---
arch/x86/inc
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