Re: [PATCH v2] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code

2016-06-20 Thread Pedro Alves
On 06/20/2016 08:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 9:29 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> Setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace is wrong: if we happen to do it during >> syscall entry, then we'll confuse seccomp and audit. (The former >> isn't a security problem: seccomp is currently enti

Re: [PATCH v2] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code

2016-06-20 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 9:29 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > Setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace is wrong: if we happen to do it during > syscall entry, then we'll confuse seccomp and audit. (The former > isn't a security problem: seccomp is currently entirely insecure if a > malicious ptracer is attached.)

[PATCH v2] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code

2016-06-20 Thread Andy Lutomirski
Setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace is wrong: if we happen to do it during syscall entry, then we'll confuse seccomp and audit. (The former isn't a security problem: seccomp is currently entirely insecure if a malicious ptracer is attached.) As a minimal fix, this patch adds a new flag TS_I386_REGS_POKED