Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs

On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. > > Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld > Cc: David Safford > Cc: Mimi Zohar > Cc: David Howells > Cc: keyri...@vger.kernel.org > Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: James Morris --

[PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs

Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: David Safford Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: David Howells Cc: keyri...@vger.kernel.org Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org --- security/keys/trusted.c | 7 --- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --g