Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory

2018-10-02 Thread Michal Hocko
On Sat 15-09-18 09:23:02, Dan Williams wrote: > Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and > return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the > location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has > predictable first-in-first-out behavior for physical

Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory

2018-09-21 Thread Dan Williams
On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:51 PM Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) wrote: > > > > -Original Message- > > From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org > ow...@vger.kernel.org> On Behalf Of Kees Cook > > Sent: Friday, September 21, 2018 2:13 PM > > Subject

RE: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory

2018-09-21 Thread Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
> -Original Message- > From: linux-kernel-ow...@vger.kernel.org ow...@vger.kernel.org> On Behalf Of Kees Cook > Sent: Friday, September 21, 2018 2:13 PM > Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory ... > I'd be curious to hear more about the ment

Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory

2018-09-21 Thread Kees Cook
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Sat, 15 Sep 2018 09:23:02 -0700 Dan Williams > wrote: > >> Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and >> return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the >> location of sensitive data objects. The kernel

Re: [PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory

2018-09-17 Thread Andrew Morton
On Sat, 15 Sep 2018 09:23:02 -0700 Dan Williams wrote: > Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and > return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the > location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has > predictable first-in-first-out behavior f

[PATCH 0/3] mm: Randomize free memory

2018-09-15 Thread Dan Williams
Data exfiltration attacks via speculative execution and return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, has predictable first-in-first-out behavior for physical pages. Pages are freed in physical address order when