On 2/12/19 4:00 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Tim,
>
> On Wed, 30 Jan 2019, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> Also please follow the L1TF documentation which explains for each of the
>> mitigation modes which kind of attacks are prevented and which holes
>> remain.
>>
>> It's a good start but far from wher
Tim,
On Wed, 30 Jan 2019, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Also please follow the L1TF documentation which explains for each of the
> mitigation modes which kind of attacks are prevented and which holes
> remain.
>
> It's a good start but far from where it should be.
what's the state of this?
Thanks,
Tim,
On Fri, 21 Dec 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
> Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
> We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But we want to
> send it out for everyone to take a look.
Yup, it fell through my Christmas cracks as well.
> ---
> Documentati
On 1/14/2019 5:06 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
Frankly I'd not call it Meltdown, as it works only on data in the cache,
so the defense is completely different. Seems more like a l1tf
:-).
Meltdown on x86 also seems to work only for data in L1D, but the pipel
On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Frankly I'd not call it Meltdown, as it works only on data in the cache,
> so the defense is completely different. Seems more like a l1tf
> :-).
Meltdown on x86 also seems to work only for data in L1D, but the pipeline
could be constructed in a way tha
On Mon 2019-01-14 13:06:24, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
> > > > That one really is Intel-specific (not even all x86s are affectd). Same
> > > > for Meltdown.
> > >
> > > At least for Meltdown, your claim is simply not correct.
> >
> > You are right, there may
On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > That one really is Intel-specific (not even all x86s are affectd). Same
> > > for Meltdown.
> >
> > At least for Meltdown, your claim is simply not correct.
>
> You are right, there may be few ARM chips affected by meltdown.
And some of the powerp
On Mon 2019-01-14 00:12:59, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
> > That one really is Intel-specific (not even all x86s are affectd). Same
> > for Meltdown.
>
> At least for Meltdown, your claim is simply not correct.
You are right, there may be few ARM chips affect
On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
> That one really is Intel-specific (not even all x86s are affectd). Same
> for Meltdown.
At least for Meltdown, your claim is simply not correct.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
Hi!
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen
> >> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
> >> ---
> >> Documentation/admin-guide/spectre.rst | 502
> >> ++
> >> 1 file changed, 502 insertions(+)
> >> create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/spectre.rst
> >
> > I only saw this
On Tue, Jan 08, 2019 at 05:41:37PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 1/8/19 5:11 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>
> >>
> >> Alexi,
> >>
> >> Do you have any suggestions on how to rewrite this two paragraphs? You
> >> are probably the best person to update content for this section.
> >
> > how about mov
On 1/8/19 5:11 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>
>> Alexi,
>>
>> Do you have any suggestions on how to rewrite this two paragraphs? You
>> are probably the best person to update content for this section.
>
> how about moving bpf bits out of this doc and placing them under
> Documentation/bpf/ ?
On 1/8/19 4:58 PM, Ben Greear wrote:
> On 1/7/19 9:57 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> On 12/31/18 8:22 AM, Ben Greear wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/21/2018 05:17 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
If you don't worry about security and performance is paramount, then
boot with "nospectre_v2". That's explained in
On Tue, Jan 08, 2019 at 01:12:45PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 12/23/18 3:11 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 09:44:44AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> >> +
> >> +4. Kernel sandbox attacking kernel
> >> +^^
> >> +
> >> +The kernel has support for r
On 1/7/19 9:57 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
On 12/31/18 8:22 AM, Ben Greear wrote:
On 12/21/2018 05:17 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
If you don't worry about security and performance is paramount, then
boot with "nospectre_v2". That's explained in the document.
There seem to be lots of different variants of
On 12/28/18 9:34 AM, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
>> ---
>> Documentation/admin-guide/spectre.rst | 502
>> ++
>> 1 file changed, 502 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/spectre.rst
On 12/23/18 3:11 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 09:44:44AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
>> +
>> +4. Kernel sandbox attacking kernel
>> +^^
>> +
>> +The kernel has support for running user-supplied programs within the
>> +kernel. Specific rules (su
On 12/31/18 8:22 AM, Ben Greear wrote:
>
>
> On 12/21/2018 05:17 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>>
>> If you don't worry about security and performance is paramount, then
>> boot with "nospectre_v2". That's explained in the document.
>
> There seem to be lots of different variants of this type of problem.
On 12/31/2018 8:22 AM, Ben Greear wrote:
On 12/21/2018 05:17 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
On 12/21/18 1:59 PM, Ben Greear wrote:
On 12/21/18 9:44 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
Thomas,
Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But
On 12/21/2018 05:17 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
On 12/21/18 1:59 PM, Ben Greear wrote:
On 12/21/18 9:44 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
Thomas,
Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But we want to
send it out for everyone to ta
On Fri, 21 Dec 2018 09:44:44 -0800
Tim Chen wrote:
> Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
> We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But we want to
> send it out for everyone to take a look.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Tim
>
> From: Andi Kleen
>
> There are no
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 09:44:44AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> +
> +4. Kernel sandbox attacking kernel
> +^^
> +
> +The kernel has support for running user-supplied programs within the
> +kernel. Specific rules (such as bounds checking) are enforced on these
> +program
On 12/21/18 1:59 PM, Ben Greear wrote:
> On 12/21/18 9:44 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> Thomas,
>>
>> Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
>> We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But we want to
>> send it out for everyone to take a look.
>
> Can you add a s
On 12/21/18 9:44 AM, Tim Chen wrote:
Thomas,
Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But we want to
send it out for everyone to take a look.
Can you add a section on how to compile out all mitigations that have a
Thomas,
Andi and I have made an update to our draft of the Spectre admin guide.
We may be out on Christmas vacation for a while. But we want to
send it out for everyone to take a look.
Thanks.
Tim
From: Andi Kleen
There are no document in admin guides describing
Spectre v1 and v2 side channe
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