On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 6:19 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 4:39 PM Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 4:55 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
>> > On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 12:28 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
>> >> > +linux-api, I g
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 4:39 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 4:55 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 12:28 AM Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> >> > +linux-api, I guess
> >> >
> >> > On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 8:39 PM Jann Ho
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 4:55 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 12:28 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
>> > +linux-api, I guess
>> >
>> > On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 8:39 PM Jann Horn wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Restrict the ability to inspect kernel st
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 12:28 AM Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > +linux-api, I guess
> >
> > On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 8:39 PM Jann Horn wrote:
> >>
> >> Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
> >> in order to prevent a l
On 09/12/2018 03:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
+linux-api, I guess
On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 8:39 PM Jann Horn wrote:
Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy
On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:29 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> +linux-api, I guess
>
> On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 8:39 PM Jann Horn wrote:
>>
>> Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
>> in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
>> to leak kerne
+linux-api, I guess
On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 8:39 PM Jann Horn wrote:
>
> Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
> in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
> to leak kernel task stack contents.
> See the added comment for a longer
Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
to leak kernel task stack contents.
See the added comment for a longer rationale.
There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't
gra
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