Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:45 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@amacapital.net): >> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: >> > Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (se...@hallyn.com): >> >> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): >> >> > Andy Lutomirski wr

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Andy Lutomirski (l...@amacapital.net): > On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (se...@hallyn.com): > >> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): > >> > Andy Lutomirski writes: > >> > > >> > > If a process gets access to a mount from

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (se...@hallyn.com): >> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): >> > Andy Lutomirski writes: >> > >> > > If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated >> > > user namespace, that proce

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): >> Andy Lutomirski writes: >> >> > If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated >> > user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of >> > setuid

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (se...@hallyn.com): > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): > > Andy Lutomirski writes: > > > > > If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated > > > user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of > > > setuid files o

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Eric W. Biederman >>> Seth, this should address a problem that's related to yours. If a >>> userns creates and untrusted fs (by any means, although admittedly fuse >>> and user namespaces don't work all th

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebied...@xmission.com): > Andy Lutomirski writes: > > > If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated > > user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of > > setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. > > > > This

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Andy Lutomirski writes: > >> If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated >> user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of >> setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. >> >> Th

Re: [PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Eric W. Biederman
Andy Lutomirski writes: > If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated > user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of > setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. > > This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be > mou

[PATCH] fs: Treat non-ancestor-namespace mounts as MNT_NOSUID

2014-10-14 Thread Andy Lutomirski
If a process gets access to a mount from a descendent or unrelated user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be mounted in non-root user namespaces. Th