RE: [PATCH] Fix /proc/[pid]/ns permissions

> From: Eric W. Biederman [mailto:ebied...@xmission.com] > > I agree there is an inconsistency on the directory permissions for the ns > directory that could reasonably be fixed. So you'd recommend taking this patch as-is? > prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) is an interesting. Fundamentally it is about

Re: [PATCH] Fix /proc/[pid]/ns permissions

"Banerjee, Debabrata" writes: > Actually, this patch is incomplete. proc_ns_get_link() and > proc_ns_readlink() gate on ptrace_may_access(task, > PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). I'm not sure why this is here either. It > seems problematic that after a user creates a pid namespace, that a > user canno

Re: [PATCH] Fix /proc/[pid]/ns permissions

Actually, this patch is incomplete. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() gate on ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). I'm not sure why this is here either. It seems problematic that after a user creates a pid namespace, that a user cannot tell anymore which namespace new pids

[PATCH] Fix /proc/[pid]/ns permissions

This seems like a bug since the original commit 6b4e306aa3dc. Having ns directory be executable but not readable does not make sense. Further, it breaks userspace when it needs to know which namespace it belongs to. For example, setting a process to prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) immediately hides the n