David Rientjes wrote:
> Ping?
>
> This can be something that can easily be removed if it becomes obsoleted
> because the oom reaper is always able to free memory to the extent of
> exit_mmap(). I argue that it cannot, because it cannot do free_pgtables()
> for large amounts of virtual memory,
Hello.
David Wagner wrote:
> If the attacker gets full administrator-level access on your machine,
> there are a gazillion ways the attacker can prevent other admins from
> logging on. This patch can't prevent that. It sounds like this patch
> is trying to solve a fundamentally unsolveable proble
Basic functions to get canonicalized absolute pathnames
for TOMOYO Linux. Even the requested pathname is symlink()ed
or chroot()ed, TOMOYO Linux uses the original pathname.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
security/tomoyo/realpath.c
To avoid namespace_sem deadlock, this patch uses
"current->last_vfsmount" associated by wrapper functions.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 822 +++
1 file chan
This patch allows administrators use conditional permission.
TOMOYO Linux supports conditional permission based on
process's UID,GID etc. and/or requested pathname's UID/GID.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
security/tomoyo/conditio
TOMOYO Linux checks permission for non-POSIX capability
so that the number of capabilities won't be limited to 32 or 64.
Each permission can be automatically accumulated into
the policy of each domain using 'learning mode'.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo H
LSM hooks for sending signal:
* task_kill_unlocked is added in sys_kill
* task_tkill_unlocked is added in sys_tkill
* task_tgkill_unlocked is added in sys_tgkill
LSM hooks for network accept and recv:
* socket_post_accept is modified to return int.
* post_recv_datagram is added in sk
TOMOYO Linux is placed in security/tomoyo .
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
security/Kconfig |1 +
security/Makefile|1 +
security/tomoyo/Kconfig | 26 ++
security/tomoyo/Makefile
TOMOYO Linux checks sending signal by signal number and
the domain of target process. In order to check signal
permission, LSM expansion patch [TOMOYO 18/18] is needed.
Each permission can be automatically accumulated into
the policy of each domain using 'learning mode'.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Ta
TOMOYO Linux checks mount permission based on
device name, mount point, filesystem type and optional flags.
TOMOYO Linux also checks permission in umount and pivot_root.
Each permission can be automatically accumulated into
the policy using 'learning mode'.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL P
TOMOYO Linux checks permission by the following four parameters.
* protocol type (TCP, UDP, RAW)
* access type (bind, listen, connect, accept)
* IP address (Both IPv4 and IPv6 are available)
* port number
In order to check 'TCP accept' and 'UDP connect',
LSM expansion patch ([TOMOYO 18/18])
TOMOYO Linux checks permission in
open/creat/unlink/truncate/ftruncate/mknod/mkdir/
rmdir/symlink/link/rename/uselib/sysctl .
Each permission can be automatically accumulated into
the policy of each domain using 'learning mode'.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tet
Every process belongs to a domain in TOMOYO Linux.
Domain transition occurs when execve(2) is called
and the domain is expressed as 'process invocation history',
such as ' /sbin/init /etc/init.d/rc'.
Domain information is stored in task_struct->security.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTE
If the executed program name and argv[0] is different,
TOMOYO Linux checks permission.
Each permission can be automatically accumulated into
the policy of each domain using 'learning mode'.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
security
TOMOYO Linux uses /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface
for reporting access logs in domain policy format.
One is 'grant_log', used for auditing accesses which are
granted in the TOMOYO Linux policy.
The other is 'reject_log', used for auditing accesses which
are not granted in the TOMOYO Linux po
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
security/tomoyo/include/realpath.h | 45 ++
security/tomoyo/include/tomoyo.h | 671 +
2 files changed, 716 insertions(+)
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.0
This patch allows LSM hooks refer previously associated "struct vfsmount"
parameter
so that they can calculate pathname of given "struct dentry".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/fs.h | 138 +
1 file changed, 1
This patch replaces VFS helper function calls caused by
userland process's request with VFS wrapper functions call.
This patch doesn't modify individual filesystems in fs/*/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
fs/namei.c | 34 +++---
"TOMOYO Linux" is our work in the field of security enhancement for Linux.
You can try TOMOYO Linux 1.5.1 on Ubuntu 7.10's Live CD
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/?TomoyoLive
Changes from previous posting.
* Made patches against latest -mm tree.
This time, we made patches for -mm tree.
This patch allows VFS wrapper functions associate "struct vfsmount"
with "struct task_struct" so that LSM hooks can calculate
pathname of given "struct dentry".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
include/linux/init_task.h |1 +
include/linux/sched.h |2 ++
2 files cha
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