On 03/31/2016 04:33 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> From: David Gstir
>
> Implement the leftpad() system call such that userspace,
> especially node.js applications, can in the near future directly
> use it and no longer depend on fragile npm packages.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir
> Signed-
On 03/29/2016 05:25 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>> Yeah I had toyed with using hashes, I used hash_64 not md5 which is like 14
>> extra instructions or something.
>
> That sounds fine. Anything that requires
On 03/29/2016 04:34 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 4:38 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> Then there's an unanswered question: is this patch acceptable given
>> that it's an ABI break? Security fixes are sometimes an exception to
>> the "no ABI breaks" rule, but it's by no m
On 03/29/2016 04:54 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>
>> These patches implement the necessary changes to generate a cookie
>> which will be placed above signal frame upon signal delivery to userland.
>> The cookie is generated using a per-process
On 03/29/2016 03:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:53 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> Sigreturn-oriented programming is a new attack vector in userland
>> where an attacker crafts a fake signal frame on the stack and calls
>> sigreturn. The kernel will extract the fake signal
On 03/29/2016 01:59 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 01:53:26PM -0600, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> This patch adds a sysctl argument to disable SROP protection.
>
> Sysctl needs to be documented in Documentation/sysctl/
>
> Also negated sysctl is weird, normally they are positive (ena
On 03/09/2016 01:32 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Scott Bauer wrote:
>
>> This patch adds a per-process secret to the task struct which
>> will be used during signal delivery and during a sigreturn.
>> Also, logic is added in signal.c to generate, place, extract,
>> clear and verify the signal
On 03/08/2016 02:57 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>>> This patch adds a per-process se
On 03/08/2016 02:57 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>>> This patch adds a per-process se
On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> This patch adds a per-process secret to the task struct which
>> will be used during signal delivery and during a sigreturn.
>> Also, logic is added in signal.c to generate, place, extract,
>>
On 03/08/2016 02:03 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>> static int ia32_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
>> - struct sigcontext_32 __user *sc)
>> + struct sigcontext_32 __user *sc,
>> + void __user **
On 02/08/2016 02:50 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 7, 2016 at 12:10 AM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 02/06/2016 11:35 PM, Mika Penttilä wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07.02.2016 01:39, Scott Bauer wrote:
>>>> This
On 02/06/2016 11:35 PM, Mika Penttilä wrote:
> Hi,
>
>
> On 07.02.2016 01:39, Scott Bauer wrote:
>> This patch adds SROP mitigation logic to the x86 signal delivery
>> and sigreturn code. The cookie is placed in the unused alignment
>> space above the saved FP state, if it exists. If there is n
On 01/05/2016 02:13 PM, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 05 2016 at 3:16pm -0500,
> Mike Snitzer wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 08 2015 at 1:26pm -0500,
>> Scotty Bauer wrote:
>>
>>> Friendly ping, is anyone interested in this?
>>
>> The passed @
On 12/01/2015 11:11 AM, Scotty wrote:
>
> 0001-dm-ioctl-Access-user-land-memory-through-safe-functi.patch
>
>
> From b26adf880eba03ac6f2b1dd87426bb96fd2a0282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Scotty Bauer
> Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 10:52:46 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] dm
wrote:
> On Thu, 3 Dec 2015 13:54:30 -0700
> Scotty Bauer wrote:
>
>> Since I've seen this a couple times now I'm wondering if my
>> understanding of touching user-land memory is flawed.
>>
>> For the above example Ioctl, the proper way to get access to th
ches to fix the issues I've found,
but now I'm doubting whether they're really issues at all.
Thanks,
Scotty
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From b26adf880eba03ac6f2b1dd87426bb96fd2a0282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Scotty Bauer
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 10:52:46 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] dm ioctl: Access user-land memory through safe functions.
This patch fixes a user-land dereference. Now we use
the safe copy_from_user to access the
Hi Kun,
On 08/11/2015 08:42 PM, Kun Huang wrote:
> Hi Scotty
>
> I have read your links. I found the read from 'trace' and the write to
> 'trace_marker' are normal read&write which works like proc system.
>
> I have questions that what's more di
It is possible to trace from userland, Android does it.
Essentially you need to write your data into
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker
then read it out of /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
If you care how the implementation works you can read it in
/kernel/tracing/trace.c
(http://lxr.fr
On 02/11/2015 02:55 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 01/30/2015 01:26 PM, Scotty Bauer wrote:
>> mwait_play_dead previously issued a CLFLUSH to work around a bug on
>> some xeon processors. We can now determine if the CPU is a buggy CPU.
>> This patch checks if if we're o
things
consistent. I can work on that over the weekend.
--Scotty
On 02/06/2015 09:13 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> From: Borislav Petkov
> Subject: [PATCH] x86, smpboot: Call CLFLUSH only on
> X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR-affected CPUs
>
> Make the AAI65 erratum workaround for Xeon 740
mwait_play_dead previously issued a CLFLUSH to work around a bug on some xeon
processors. We can now determine if the CPU is a buggy CPU. This patch checks
if if we're on a buggy CPU which allows non-buggy cpu's to eliminate the
CLFLUSH.
>From 3da1be5c998a8d51f98fdba09b3cb477526c5ff3 Mon Se
urther clean up, if required.
-Scotty
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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Fix undefined behavior and compiler warning by replacing right
shift 32 with upper_32_bits macro
Signed-off-by: Scotty Bauer
---
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ce81291..c78530b 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b
ater than or equal to
the width
of the promoted left operand, the behavior is undefined."
Is there some promotion, compiler flag, something obvious that I am missing, or
is this a
problem?
Best,
Scotty
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