Pavel Machek wrote:
> To play devil's advocate, does RNG subsystem need to evolve? Its task
> is to get random numbers. Does it fail at the task?
>
> Problem is, random subsystem is hard to verify, and big rewrite is
> likely to cause security problems...
Parts of the problem, though, are dead e
Eric Curtin wrote:
> Hope I'm not bothering you. I'm looking for a masters thesis idea, ...
Here's a report claiming 70% of security bugs involve memory errors.
https://www.zdnet.com/article/chrome-70-of-all-security-bugs-are-memory-safety-issues/
Build a tool to find or fix those?
Another repo
On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 01:24:18PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> Good luck with getting approval... While Ted and I have our
>> differences like any two kernel developers, I really tend agree with
>> him in his attitude about this FIPS
Sandy Harris wrote:
> The biggest problem with random(4) is that you cannot generate good
> output without a good seed & just after boot, ...
>
> The only really good solution I know of is to find a way to provide a
> chunk of randomness early in the boot process. Joh
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 5:08 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> I've been trying to take the best features and suggestions from your
> proposal and integrating them into /dev/random already.
A good approach.
> Things that I've chosen not take is basically because I disbelieve
> that the Jitter RNG is v
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:49 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:36 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 10:53:35AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>>> > Suppressing all messages for all configurations cast a wider net than
>>> > necessary. Configurations that c
iver at
https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell The only kernel-space code I
know of is Stephan's.
If the claim that such calls give entropy is accepted (which I think
it should be) then if we get one bit per call, need 100 or so bits &
space the calls 100 ns apart, loading up a decent chunk of start
The only sensible & general solution for the initialisation problem
that I have seen is John Denker's.
http://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/secure-random.htm#sec-boot-image
If I read that right, it would require only minor kernel changes &
none to the API Ted & others are worrying about. It would be s
Add Ted T'so to cc list. Shouldn't he be included on anything affecting
the random(4) driver?
On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 8:34 AM, Corentin Labbe
wrote:
> From: LABBE Corentin
>
> The Security System have a PRNG.
> This patch add support for it as an hwrng.
Which is it? A PRNG & a HW RNG are quite
On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 02, 2016 at 06:58:10PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> On MIPS chips commonly found in inexpensive routers, this makes a big
>> difference in performance.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld
>
> Can you give some numbers ple
on is at:
https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell
A small (< 700 lines) daemon that gets entropy from timer imprecision
and variations in time for arithmetic (cache misses, interrupts, etc.)
and pumps it into /dev/random. Make it the first userspace program
started and all should be covere
Jason Cooper wrote:
> Modern systems that receive a seed from the bootloader via the
> random-seed property (typically from the hw-rng) can mix both sources
> for increased resilience.
>
> Unfortunately, I'm not very familiar with the internals of x86
> bootstrapping. Could GRUB be scripted to d
On Sun, Jun 19, 2016 at 3:36 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
>> The following patch set provides a different approach to /dev/random ...
>
> Dunno. It is very similar to existing rng, AFAICT.
I do not think so. A lot of the basic principles are the same of course,
but Stephan is suggesting some real cha
David Jaša wrote:
>
> BTW when looking at an old BSI's issue with Linux urandom that Jarod
> Wilson tried to solve with this series:
> https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg06113.html
> I was thinking:
> 1) wouldn't it help for large urandom consumers if kernel created a DRBG
> instance f
word like a pointer, but there's clearly
> people around who have tried to search for good hashes that really
> spread out the bits.
>
> Linus
Here's another possibility, from my GPL code at:
https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell
Not very efficient -- two each
On Wed, May 4, 2016 at 11:50 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> Instead of arguing over who's "sane" or "insane", can we come up with
> a agreed upon set of tests, and a set of compiler and compiler
> versions ...
I completely fail to see why tests or compiler versions should be
part of the discussion.
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 12:06 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
> Sandy Harris writes:
>
> There is also the third problem of horrible scalability of /dev/random
> output on larger systems, for which patches are getting ignored.
I did not write that. I think Andi is quoting himself here, not
Stephan has recently proposed some extensive changes to this driver,
and I proposed a quite different set earlier. My set can be found at:
https://github.com/sandy-harris
This post tries to find the bits of both proposals that seem clearly
worth doing and entail neither large implementation
gt; - Ted
Jitter, havege and my maxwell(8) all claim to get entropy from
variations in timing of simple calculations, and the docs for
all three give arguments that there really is some entropy
there.
Some of those arguments are quite strong. Mine are in
This set of patches, plus some later ones that simplify the
code and get rid of one major bug are now at:
https://github.com/sandy-harris
Directory for these changes is random.gcm
An out-of-kernel test program for an older version
is in random.test
On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 1:50 PM, Sandy Harris
e comments on both
the rationale for this approach & the details of my
implementation.
random_gcm.c is not close to being a finished
product, in particular my code is not yet well
integrated with existing driver code.
Most of the code was developed and has been
fairly well tested outside th
On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Jason Cooper wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 07, 2015 at 09:30:36AM -0500, Sandy Harris wrote:
>> Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
>> ---
>> .gitignore | 3 +++
>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/.gitignore b/.git
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
Kbuild | 21 +
scripts/Makefile | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Kbuild b/Kbuild
index f55cefd..494c665 100644
--- a/Kbuild
+++ b/Kbuild
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
# 2) Generate timeconst.h
# 3) Generate asm-offsets.h
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
drivers/char/Kconfig | 23 +++
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index a043107..0e0e6b5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -603,5 +603,28 @@ config TILE_SROM
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
scripts/gen_random.c | 260 +++
1 file changed, 260 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 scripts/gen_random.c
diff --git a/scripts/gen_random.c b/scripts/gen_random.c
new file mode 100644
index 000..07b447f
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
drivers/char/Makefile | 25 -
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/Makefile b/drivers/char/Makefile
index d8a7579..7d095e5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,30
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
drivers/char/random_gcm.c | 3716 +
1 file changed, 3716 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/random_gcm.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/random_gcm.c b/drivers/char/random_gcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
.gitignore | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index fd3a355..dd80bfd 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -112,3 +112,6 @@ all.config
# Kdevelop4
*.kdev4
+
+certs/x509_certificate_list
+scripts/gen_random
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
drivers/char/random.c | 50 ++
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d0da5d8..e222e0f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d0da5d8..90c472b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
* not be attributed
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 5:59 AM, Boris Brezillon
wrote:
> Add support for DES operations.
Why on Earth should we do that? DES is demonstrably insecure. The only
possible excuse for allowing it anywhere in a modern code base is that
you need it to implement triple DES, and even that should by now
On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 6:58 PM, Herbert Xu wrote:
> Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>
>> I hear more and more discussions about recommendations to use AES 256 and not
>> AES 128.
Or perhaps other ciphers with 256-bit keys. Salsa, ChaCha and several of
the Caesar candidates support those.
>> These kin
On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 11:33 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> The kernel_pool is intended to be the in-kernel equivalent to the
> blocking_pool, i.e. requests for random data may be blocked if
> insufficient entropy is present.
I cannot see any reason this would be useful, let alone necessary.
Of c
I realise that in general reading files from kernel space is a bad
idea, and understand at least some of the reasons. I have read Greg
K-H's article on the topic (http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/8110)
and some other discussion. However, I think I see a specific exception
and am looking for opin
On Sun, Nov 9, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> while working on the AF_ALG interface, I saw no active zeroizations of memory
> that may hold sensitive data that is maintained outside the kernel crypto API
> cipher handles. ...
> I think I found the location for the first one: hash_sock
I've been reading the debates around systemd, haven't reached any firm
conclusion but the criticism that Unix programs should "do one thing
and do it well" certainly resonates with me.
On the other hand, this may be one of those cases where theory and
practice need to differ; more-or-less all the
Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> Fundamentally, what worries me about this scheme (actually, causes the
> hair on the back of my neck to rise up on end) is this statement in
> your documentation[1]:
>
>When looking at the sequence of time deltas gathered
>during testing [D] , no pattern can be dete
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> [quoting me]
>> ...your code is basically, with 64-bit x:
>>
>> for( i=0, x = 0 ; i < 64; i++, x =rotl(x) )
>>x |= bit()
>
> Why not declare some 64-bit constant C with a significant
>>number of bits set and do this:
>>
>> for( i=0, x = 0 ; i < 64; i++, x =ro
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>Why not declare some 64-bit constant C with a significant
>
> Which constant would you take? The CRC twist values? The SHA-1 initial
> values? Or the first few from SHA-256?
The only essential requirement is that it not be something stup
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 10:40 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Another thing: when you start adding whitening functions, other people
> are starting (and did -- thus I added section 4.3 to my documentation)
> to complain that you hide your weaknesses behind the whiteners. I simply
> want to counter t
On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:38 AM, Sandy Harris wrote:
> Stephan Mueller wrote:
>> Can you please help me understand why you think that a whitening
>> function (cryptographic or not) is needed in the case of the CPU Jitter
>> RNG, provided that I can show that each individua
Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>Paper has:
>>
>>" the time delta is partitioned into chunks of 1 bit starting at the
>>lowest bit " The 64 1 bit chunks of the time value are XORed with
>>each other to " form a 1 bit value.
>>
>>As I read that, you are just taking the parity. Why not use that
>>simp
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
I like the basic idea. Here I'm alternately reading the email and the
page you link to & commenting on both.
A nitpick in the paper is that you cite RFC 1750. That was superceded
some years back by RFC 4086
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc408
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Ted is right that the non-deterministic behavior is caused by the OS
> due to its complexity. ...
>> > For VM's, it means we should definitely use
>> > paravirtualization to get randomness from the host OS.
>> ...
>
> That is already in place at least with KVM and Xen a
On Tue, May 21, 2013 at 3:01 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> I continue to be suspicious about claims that userspace timing
> measurements are measuring anything other than OS behaviour.
Yes, but they do seem to contain some entropy. See links in the
original post of this thread, the havege stuff and
I very much like the basic notion here. The existing random(4) driver
may not get enough entropy in a VM or on a device like a Linux router
and I think work such as yours or HAVEGE
(http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/) are important research.
The paper by McGuire et al of "Analysis of inheren
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 9:17 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> There is no state between calls. Of course, you need a scratchpad to do
> calculations.
But in general you need a buffer. It is quite easy to construct scenarios where
several K bits of entropy are needed very -- for example, reboot an IP
On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 2:32 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> On 10.02.2013 19:50:02, +0100, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> Given all your doubts on the high-precision timer, how can you
> reasonably state that the Linux kernel RNG is good then?
>
> The data from add_timer_randomness the kernel feeds into
On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 1:50 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 10, 2013 at 01:46:18PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>
>> However, the CPU has timing jitter in the execution of instruction. And
>> I try to harvest that jitter. The good thing is that this jitter is
>> always present and can b
I'm wondering whether we have or need a formalisation of how work might be
divided in future kernels.
The question I'm interested in is how the work gets split up among various
components at different levels within a single box (not SMP with many at
the same level, or various multi-box techniques
Kurt Garloff wrote:
> Kernel related questions IMHO are:
> (1) Why do we get into OOM?
There was a long thread about this a few months back. We get into OOM because
malloc(), calloc() etc. can allocate more memory than is actually available.
e.g. Say you have machine with 64 RAM + 64 swap = 128
Jesse Pollard wrote:
> >Is there an alternative to BIND that's free software? Never seen
> >one.
>
> Not one that is Open Source
Australia's RMIT and Ercisson have an Open Source load-balancing distributed
web server, including a DNS server to do the balancing.
The link I have, www.eddiew
Alexander Viro wrote:
> > Have you thought about supporting .tar.gz into ramfs? Creating custom
> > boot images would be simpler.
>
> *uh*. It's definitely easier to do than it used to be, but I'm seriously
> sceptical about adding more cruft into the thing. ...
>
> (I presume that you mean "un
Dave Cinege wrote:
>
> ... 'md=' for each device on
> the cmdline, but unfortuantly it's broken.
>
> Between a few emails to mingo and several wasted hours, I've managed to figure
> out the problem. However I don't know how to fix it; it *should*
> be working from what I can see.
>
> My only gu
jamal wrote:
> > What problem does this fix?
> >
> > If you are mucking with the ifindex, you may be affecting many places
> > in the rest of the kernel, as well as user-space programs which use
> > ifindex to bind to raw devices.
>
> I am talking about 2.5 possibilities now that 2.4 is out. I th
Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> "Mike A. Harris" wrote:
> >
> > Anyone looked into this?
>
> It's an implementation of Domain Enforcement, ported
> from the flask project. It is a prototype.
These folks are good at what they do and the code is GPL.
It is worth starting to consider whether this code,
Karel Kulhavy wrote:
>
> There are several places where the rotation yields garbage according to ANSI
> C definition when called with 0 bit position argument.
>
> diff -Pur linux_reference/drivers/char/random.c linux/drivers/char/random.c
> --- linux_reference/drivers/char/random.c Wed Jul
Jeff Garzik wrote:
>
> "Oliver M . Bolzer" wrote:
> >
> > Hi!
> >
> > Recently I needed a lot of entroy for cryptographic purposes on a
> > server and took a look at where the entroy for drivers/char/random.c
> > was coming from, as the server didn't have any activly used mouse/keyboard.
> >
> >
This came up on the FreeS/WAN list and seemed to me worth raising on
the kernel list...
Original Message
Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: trying to build on RHL7.0
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2000 14:54:50 -0400 (EDT)
From: "D. Hugh Redelmeier" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[snip discussion of various bi
Don Becker has some text at:
http://www.scyld.com/expert/irq-conflict.html
which includes a section:
> Why SA_INTERRUPT in the SCSI drivers is a Bad Thing
> ... it could potentially have a very negative impact on all other interrupt-driven
> kernel service. That includes just about everything
Gisle S{lensminde wrote:
> On Fri, 22 Sep 2000, Alexander S A Kjeldaas wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Sep 22, 2000 at 11:46:02AM +0200, Gisle Sælensminde wrote:
> > >
> > > Since des_ede3(3des) now is added to the international kernel, it will
> > > probably be a good idea to add support for it in losetu
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" wrote:
>
>Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2000 09:56:12 +
>From: Pravir Chandra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>i agree that the yarrow generator does place some faith on the crypto
>cipher and the accumulator uses a hash, but current /dev/random
>places faith on a crc and ur
Pravir Chandra wrote:
>
> I've been working to change the implementation of /dev/random over to the
> Yarrow-160a algorithm created by Bruce Schneier and John Kelsey.
For some old discussions on related topics, see:
http://www.openpgp.net/random/
> We've been
> working on parallel development f
63 matches
Mail list logo
