Re: Buffer Over-runs, was Open source firewalls

2005-07-15 Thread RVK
Arjan van de Ven wrote: On Fri, 2005-07-15 at 13:56 +0530, RVK wrote: except this is no longer true really ;) randomisation for example makes this a lot harder to do. gcc level tricks to prevent buffer overflows are widely in use nowadays too (FORTIFY_SOURCE and -fstack-protector). The

Re: Buffer Over-runs, was Open source firewalls

2005-07-15 Thread RVK
Arjan van de Ven wrote: On Fri, 2005-07-15 at 13:56 +0530, RVK wrote: except this is no longer true really ;) randomisation for example makes this a lot harder to do. gcc level tricks to prevent buffer overflows are widely in use nowadays too (FORTIFY_SOURCE and -fstack-protector). The

Re: Buffer Over-runs, was Open source firewalls

2005-07-15 Thread RVK
Arjan van de Ven wrote: On Fri, 2005-07-15 at 13:56 +0530, RVK wrote: except this is no longer true really ;) randomisation for example makes this a lot harder to do. gcc level tricks to prevent buffer overflows are widely in use nowadays too (FORTIFY_SOURCE and -fstack-protector). The

Re: Buffer Over-runs, was Open source firewalls

2005-07-15 Thread RVK
Arjan van de Ven wrote: On Fri, 2005-07-15 at 12:11 +0530, RVK wrote: Even in the presence of non-executable stack, Linux Torvalds explains that "It's really easy. You do something like this: 1) overflow the buffer on the stack, so that the return value is overwritten by a poin

Re: Buffer Over-runs, was Open source firewalls

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
he above exploit. It probably takes all of five lines of changes to some existing exploit, and some random program to find out where in the address space the shared libraries tend to be loaded." rvk but your system is not compromised. One final point, in practice, you get lots of unw

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
J.A. Magallon wrote: On 07.14, RVK wrote: Ian Campbell wrote: On Thu, 2005-07-14 at 16:32 +0530, RVK wrote: Ian Campbell wrote: What Arjan is saying is that pthread_t is a cookie -- this means that you cannot interpret it in any way, it is just a "thing&q

Re: Open source firewalls

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
Helge Hafting wrote: RVK wrote: Proxies can be a good way of filtering but it can't avoid buffer overflows. Yes they can - did you read and udnerstand my previous post at all? A proxy _can_ avoid a buffer overflow by noticing the anomalously large data item and simply refuse to pass

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
ot of applications using that. rvk Jakub - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Re: Open source firewalls

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
right ? So the best way is either make your code free of buffer overflows or use some library which controls the attack during any buffer overflow or use Stack Randomisation and Canary based approaches. rvk Helge Hafting wrote: RVK wrote: I don't think buffer overflow has anything

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
Ian Campbell wrote: On Thu, 2005-07-14 at 16:32 +0530, RVK wrote: Ian Campbell wrote: What Arjan is saying is that pthread_t is a cookie -- this means that you cannot interpret it in any way, it is just a "thing" which you can pass back to the API, that pthread_t hap

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
Arjan van de Ven wrote: On Thu, 2005-07-14 at 15:36 +0530, RVK wrote: it doesn't return a number it returns a pointer ;) or a floating point number. You don't know :) what it returns is a *cookie*. A cookie that you can only use to pass back to various pthread functions.

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
Ian Campbell wrote: On Thu, 2005-07-14 at 15:36 +0530, RVK wrote: bits/pthreadtypes.h:150:typedef unsigned long int pthread_t; That's an implementation detail which you cannot determine any information from. What Arjan is saying is that pthread_t is a cookie -- this means tha

Re: Open source firewalls

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
DS to detect these attacks accurately. rvk Helge Hafting wrote: Vinay Venkataraghavan wrote: I know how to implement buffer overflow attacks. But how would an intrusion detection system detect a buffer overflow attack. Buffer overflow attacks vary, but have one thing in common. The ove

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-14 Thread RVK
Arjan van de Ven wrote: On Thu, 2005-07-14 at 11:03 +0530, RVK wrote: Robert Hancock wrote: RVK wrote: Can anyone suggest me how to get the threadId using 2.6.x kernels. pthread_self() does not work and returns some -ve integer. What do you mean, negative integer

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-13 Thread RVK
Robert Hancock wrote: RVK wrote: Can anyone suggest me how to get the threadId using 2.6.x kernels. pthread_self() does not work and returns some -ve integer. What do you mean, negative integer? It's not an integer, it's a pthread_t, you're not even supposed to look at

Re: Thread_Id

2005-07-13 Thread RVK
You are right Bengettid() will do for me. Previously for 2.4.x (2.4.18)thread libraries I normally was using pthread_self(). Raghu Benedikt Spranger wrote: Hi, Can anyone suggest me how to get the threadId using 2.6.x kernels. pthread_self() does not work and returns some -ve integer.

Thread_Id

2005-07-05 Thread RVK
Can anyone suggest me how to get the threadId using 2.6.x kernels. pthread_self() does not work and returns some -ve integer. thanks rvk - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo inf