Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

2007-12-12 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Wed, 2007-12-12 at 14:53 +, David Howells wrote: > Karl MacMillan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > That's what I remember as well - I suggested the transition idea and > > then, after discussion, agreed that it wasn't the best approach. > > Sigh

Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

2007-12-12 Thread Karl MacMillan
ow many programs in the distribution > currently link against libselinux, whether directly or by dlopen'ing it. > > > > > I use to do that, but someone objected... Possibly Karl MacMillan. > > > > > > Yes, but I think I disagreed then too. > > &

Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

2007-06-15 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Fri, 2007-06-15 at 14:44 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > On Fri, Jun 15, 2007 at 05:28:35PM -0400, Karl MacMillan wrote: > > On Fri, 2007-06-15 at 14:14 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > > On Fri, Jun 15, 2007 at 01:43:31PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > > > > > >

Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

2007-06-15 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Fri, 2007-06-15 at 14:14 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > On Fri, Jun 15, 2007 at 01:43:31PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > > > Yup, I see that once you accept the notion that it is OK for a > > file to be misslabeled for a bit and that having a fixxerupperd > > is sufficient it all falls out. > > >

Re: [AppArmor 38/45] AppArmor: Module and LSM hooks

2007-06-12 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-06-12 at 10:34 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Stephen Smalley ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): [...] > > > > If we added support for named type transitions to SELinux, as proposed > > earlier by Kyle Moffett during this discussion, wouldn't that address > > that issue without needing a

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-20 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Fri, 2007-04-20 at 11:45 -0700, David Lang wrote: > On Thu, 19 Apr 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > already happened to integrate such support into userland. > > > > To look at it in a slightly different way, the AA emphasis on not > > modifying applications could be viewed as a limitation.

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 16:09 -0700, Crispin Cowan wrote: > David Safford wrote: > > On Mon, 2007-04-16 at 20:20 -0400, James Morris wrote: > > > > The meaning of a file is how other processes interpret it. Until then, > /etc/resolv.conf is just a quaint bag of bits. What makes it special is >

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 15:55 -0700, Crispin Cowan wrote: > Karl MacMillan wrote: > > On Mon, 2007-04-16 at 20:20 -0400, James Morris wrote: > > > >> On Mon, 16 Apr 2007, John Johansen wrote: > >> > >>> Label-based security (exemplified by SELin

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Wed, 2007-04-18 at 00:12 +0200, Andi Kleen wrote: > > The vast majority of applications are not > > modified to be SELinux aware - only a small handful of security aware > > applications are modified. > > All applications that can edit /etc/resolv.conf? That's nearly > everything. You yoursel

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 20:10 +0200, Andi Kleen wrote: > On Tue, Apr 17, 2007 at 01:47:39PM -0400, James Morris wrote: > > Normal applications need zero modification under SELinux. > > > > Some applications which manage security may need to be made SELinux-aware, > > Anything that can touch /etc/r

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Mon, 2007-04-16 at 20:20 -0400, James Morris wrote: > On Mon, 16 Apr 2007, John Johansen wrote: > > > Label-based security (exemplified by SELinux, and its predecessors in > > MLS systems) attaches security policy to the data. As the data flows > > through the system, the label sticks to the da

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 13:19 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > --- Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > although this can often be done with PAM plugins, which is a standard way > > > to do this kind of thing in modern Unix & Linux OSs. > > > > PAM plugins in vi and emacs? Scary idea. > > >

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 23:16 +0200, Andi Kleen wrote: > > For SELinux to be effective it has to have a complete policy definition. > > This would prevent the OpenOffice access (unless OpenOffice is in the > > modify_resolv_conf_t domain) above. > > This would mean no fully functional root user anym

Re: AppArmor FAQ

2007-04-17 Thread Karl MacMillan
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 11:03 -0400, David Safford wrote: > On Mon, 2007-04-16 at 20:20 -0400, James Morris wrote: > > On Mon, 16 Apr 2007, John Johansen wrote: > > > Actually, this is pretty much how z/OS/RACF works. Labels and pathnames > for all files are stored in one database. There are advanta