From: Julien Thierry
Commit 621afc677465db231662ed126ae1f355bf8eac47 upstream.
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.
From: Julien Thierry
Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream.
Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.
Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by:
From: Julien Thierry
Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream.
When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include
check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make
__put_user() an alias of put_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-b
From: Julien Thierry
Commit a1d09e074250fad24f1b993f327b18cc6812eb7a upstream.
Sanitize user pointer given to __copy_to_user, both for standard version
and memcopy version of the user accessor.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
arch/a
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 upstream.
Use __copy_to_user() rather than __put_user_error() for individual
members when saving VFP state.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per copied struct
intead of once per write.
Signed-off-by: Julien
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 319508902600c2688e057750148487996396e9ca upstream.
Copy events to user using __copy_to_user() rather than copy members of
individually with __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per event intead of
once per event member.
Signed-off-b
From: Russell King
Commit 899a42f836678a595f7d2bc36a5a0c2b03d08cbc upstream.
Move lookup_processor_type() out of the __init section so it is callable
from (eg) the secondary startup code during hotplug.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 5df7a99bdd0de4a0480320264c44c04543c29d5a upstream.
In vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate, ufp_exc->fpinst2 gets assigned to
itself. It should actually be hwstate->fpinst2 that gets assigned to the
ufp_exc field.
Fixes commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 ("AR
From: Russell King
Commit 65987a8553061515b5851b472081aedb9837a391 upstream.
Split out the lookup of the processor type and associated error handling
from the rest of setup_processor() - we will need to use this in the
secondary CPU bringup path for big.Little Spectre variant 2 mitigation.
Revi
From: Russell King
Commit e209950fdd065d2cc46e6338e47e52841b830cba upstream.
Allow the way we access members of the processor vtable to be changed
at compile time. We will need to move to per-CPU vtables to fix the
Spectre variant 2 issues on big.Little systems.
However, we have a couple of ca
From: Russell King
Commit 945aceb1db8885d3a35790cf2e810f681db52756 upstream.
Call the per-processor type check_bugs() method in the same way as we
do other per-processor functions - move the "processor." detail into
proc-fns.h.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-of
From: Russell King
Commit 383fb3ee8024d596f488d2dbaf45e572897acbdb upstream.
In big.Little systems, some CPUs require the Spectre workarounds in
paths such as the context switch, but other CPUs do not. In order
to handle these differences, we need per-CPU vtables.
We are unable to use the kern
From: Russell King
Commit d6951f582cc50ba0ad22ef46b599740966599b14 upstream.
The intention in the previous patch was to only place the processor
tables in the .rodata section if big.Little was being built and we
wanted the branch target hardening, but instead (due to the way it
was tested) it en
From: "David A. Long"
V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
Patches have been kvm-unit-test'ed on an arndale, run through kernelci, and
handed off to ARM for functional testing.
Julien Thierry (9):
ARM: 8789/1: signal: copy registers using __copy_to_user()
A
From: Russell King
Commit 3a4d0c2172bcf15b7a3d9d498b2b355f9864286b upstream.
Marek Szyprowski reported problems with CPU hotplug in current kernels.
This was tracked down to the processor vtables being located in an
init section, and therefore discarded after kernel boot, despite being
required
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 5ca451cf6ed04443774bbb7ee45332dafa42e99f upstream.
When saving the ARM integer registers, use __copy_to_user() to
copy them into user signal frame, rather than __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once pe
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 18ea66bd6e7a95bdc598223d72757190916af28b upstream.
With Spectre-v1.1 mitigations, __put_user_error is pointless. In an attempt
to remove it, replace its references in frame setups with __put_user.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 5ca451cf6ed04443774bbb7ee45332dafa42e99f upstream.
When saving the ARM integer registers, use __copy_to_user() to
copy them into user signal frame, rather than __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once pe
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 18ea66bd6e7a95bdc598223d72757190916af28b upstream.
With Spectre-v1.1 mitigations, __put_user_error is pointless. In an attempt
to remove it, replace its references in frame setups with __put_user.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 621afc677465db231662ed126ae1f355bf8eac47 upstream.
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.
From: Julien Thierry
Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream.
When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include
check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make
__put_user() an alias of put_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-b
From: Russell King
Commit 65987a8553061515b5851b472081aedb9837a391 upstream.
Split out the lookup of the processor type and associated error handling
from the rest of setup_processor() - we will need to use this in the
secondary CPU bringup path for big.Little Spectre variant 2 mitigation.
Revi
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 319508902600c2688e057750148487996396e9ca upstream.
Copy events to user using __copy_to_user() rather than copy members of
individually with __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per event intead of
once per event member.
Signed-off-b
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 5df7a99bdd0de4a0480320264c44c04543c29d5a upstream.
In vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate, ufp_exc->fpinst2 gets assigned to
itself. It should actually be hwstate->fpinst2 that gets assigned to the
ufp_exc field.
Fixes commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 ("AR
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 upstream.
Use __copy_to_user() rather than __put_user_error() for individual
members when saving VFP state.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per copied struct
intead of once per write.
Signed-off-by: Julien
From: Russell King
Commit 3a4d0c2172bcf15b7a3d9d498b2b355f9864286b upstream.
Marek Szyprowski reported problems with CPU hotplug in current kernels.
This was tracked down to the processor vtables being located in an
init section, and therefore discarded after kernel boot, despite being
required
From: Julien Thierry
Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream.
Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.
Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by:
From: Russell King
Commit e209950fdd065d2cc46e6338e47e52841b830cba upstream.
Allow the way we access members of the processor vtable to be changed
at compile time. We will need to move to per-CPU vtables to fix the
Spectre variant 2 issues on big.Little systems.
However, we have a couple of ca
From: Russell King
Commit 945aceb1db8885d3a35790cf2e810f681db52756 upstream.
Call the per-processor type check_bugs() method in the same way as we
do other per-processor functions - move the "processor." detail into
proc-fns.h.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-of
From: Russell King
Commit 899a42f836678a595f7d2bc36a5a0c2b03d08cbc upstream.
Move lookup_processor_type() out of the __init section so it is callable
from (eg) the secondary startup code during hotplug.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
From: Russell King
Commit 383fb3ee8024d596f488d2dbaf45e572897acbdb upstream.
In big.Little systems, some CPUs require the Spectre workarounds in
paths such as the context switch, but other CPUs do not. In order
to handle these differences, we need per-CPU vtables.
We are unable to use the kern
From: "David A. Long"
V4.14 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
Patches have been kvm-unit-test'ed on an arndale, run through kernelci, and
handed off to ARM for functional testing.
Julien Thierry (10):
ARM: 8789/1: signal: copy registers using __copy_to_user()
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 73839798af7ebc6c8d0c9271ebbbc148700e521f upstream.
When setting a dummy iwmmxt context, create a local instance and
use __copy_to_user both cases whether iwmmxt is being used or not.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once
From: Julien Thierry
Commit a1d09e074250fad24f1b993f327b18cc6812eb7a upstream.
Sanitize user pointer given to __copy_to_user, both for standard version
and memcopy version of the user accessor.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
arch/a
From: Russell King
Commit d6951f582cc50ba0ad22ef46b599740966599b14 upstream.
The intention in the previous patch was to only place the processor
tables in the .rodata section if big.Little was being built and we
wanted the branch target hardening, but instead (due to the way it
was tested) it en
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 5ca451cf6ed04443774bbb7ee45332dafa42e99f upstream.
When saving the ARM integer registers, use __copy_to_user() to
copy them into user signal frame, rather than __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once pe
From: Julien Thierry
Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream.
When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include
check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make
__put_user() an alias of put_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-b
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 upstream.
Use __copy_to_user() rather than __put_user_error() for individual
members when saving VFP state.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per copied struct
intead of once per write.
Signed-off-by: Julien
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 319508902600c2688e057750148487996396e9ca upstream.
Copy events to user using __copy_to_user() rather than copy members of
individually with __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per event intead of
once per event member.
Signed-off-b
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 5df7a99bdd0de4a0480320264c44c04543c29d5a upstream.
In vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate, ufp_exc->fpinst2 gets assigned to
itself. It should actually be hwstate->fpinst2 that gets assigned to the
ufp_exc field.
Fixes commit 3aa2df6ec2ca6bc143a65351cca4266d03a8bc41 ("AR
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 18ea66bd6e7a95bdc598223d72757190916af28b upstream.
With Spectre-v1.1 mitigations, __put_user_error is pointless. In an attempt
to remove it, replace its references in frame setups with __put_user.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off
From: Julien Thierry
Commit a1d09e074250fad24f1b993f327b18cc6812eb7a upstream.
Sanitize user pointer given to __copy_to_user, both for standard version
and memcopy version of the user accessor.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
arch/a
From: Julien Thierry
Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream.
Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.
Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by:
From: Russell King
Commit e209950fdd065d2cc46e6338e47e52841b830cba upstream.
Allow the way we access members of the processor vtable to be changed
at compile time. We will need to move to per-CPU vtables to fix the
Spectre variant 2 issues on big.Little systems.
However, we have a couple of ca
From: Russell King
Commit 383fb3ee8024d596f488d2dbaf45e572897acbdb upstream.
In big.Little systems, some CPUs require the Spectre workarounds in
paths such as the context switch, but other CPUs do not. In order
to handle these differences, we need per-CPU vtables.
We are unable to use the kern
From: Russell King
Commit 65987a8553061515b5851b472081aedb9837a391 upstream.
Split out the lookup of the processor type and associated error handling
from the rest of setup_processor() - we will need to use this in the
secondary CPU bringup path for big.Little Spectre variant 2 mitigation.
Revi
From: Russell King
Commit 899a42f836678a595f7d2bc36a5a0c2b03d08cbc upstream.
Move lookup_processor_type() out of the __init section so it is callable
from (eg) the secondary startup code during hotplug.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
From: Russell King
Commit 3a4d0c2172bcf15b7a3d9d498b2b355f9864286b upstream.
Marek Szyprowski reported problems with CPU hotplug in current kernels.
This was tracked down to the processor vtables being located in an
init section, and therefore discarded after kernel boot, despite being
required
From: Russell King
Commit d6951f582cc50ba0ad22ef46b599740966599b14 upstream.
The intention in the previous patch was to only place the processor
tables in the .rodata section if big.Little was being built and we
wanted the branch target hardening, but instead (due to the way it
was tested) it en
From: Russell King
Commit 945aceb1db8885d3a35790cf2e810f681db52756 upstream.
Call the per-processor type check_bugs() method in the same way as we
do other per-processor functions - move the "processor." detail into
proc-fns.h.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry
Signed-off-by: Russell King
Signed-of
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 621afc677465db231662ed126ae1f355bf8eac47 upstream.
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.
From: Julien Thierry
Commit 73839798af7ebc6c8d0c9271ebbbc148700e521f upstream.
When setting a dummy iwmmxt context, create a local instance and
use __copy_to_user both cases whether iwmmxt is being used or not.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once
From: "David A. Long"
V4.19 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
Patches have been kvm-unit-test'ed on an arndale, run through kernelci, and
handed off to ARM for functional testing.
Julien Thierry (10):
ARM: 8789/1: signal: copy registers using __copy_to_user()
On 11/28/2016 08:22 PM, John Stultz wrote:
From: Srinivas Kandagatla
This patch enables the Audio Data and Clock pads to the adv7533 bridge.
Without this patch audio can not be played.
Cc: David Airlie
Cc: Archit Taneja
Cc: Laurent Pinchart
Cc: Wolfram Sang
Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla
Cc: "Vi
On 11/28/2016 08:22 PM, John Stultz wrote:
This patch adds support to Audio for both adv7511 and adv7533
bridge chips.
This patch was originally from [1] by Lars-Peter Clausen
and was adapted by Archit Taneja and
Srinivas Kandagatla .
Then I heavily reworked it to use the hdmi-codec driver. A
On 09/12/2016 08:46 PM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
On Mon, 12 Sep 2016 14:21:27 -0400
David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
i
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
it hits the maximum number of instructions or a load or store exclusive.
However this means it can run up past the beginning
On 09/12/2016 12:29 PM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
On Sun, 11 Sep 2016 21:53:43 -0400
David Long wrote:
On 09/10/2016 01:48 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
On Fri, 9 Sep 2016 15:26:09 -0400
David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instr
On 09/10/2016 01:48 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
On Fri, 9 Sep 2016 15:26:09 -0400
David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
i
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
it hits the maximum number of instructions or a load or store exclusive.
However this means it can run up past the beginning
On 09/07/2016 01:52 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
On Tue, 6 Sep 2016 13:54:59 -0400
David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
i
On 09/06/2016 12:11 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 11:00:07AM +0530, Pratyush Anand wrote:
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ static void send_user_sigtrap(int si_code)
static int single_step_handler(unsigne
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
it hits the maximum number of instructions or a load or store exclusive.
However this means it can run up past the beginning
On 08/31/2016 10:38 PM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
Hi Dave,
On Wed, 31 Aug 2016 16:52:22 -0400
David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops wh
From: "David A. Long"
Kprobes searches backwards a finite number of instructions to determine if
there is an attempt to probe a load/store exclusive sequence. It stops when
it hits the maximum number of instructions or a load or store exclusive.
However this means it can run up past the beginning
On 08/15/2016 11:32 AM, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
On Mon, 15 Aug 2016 10:49:36 -0400
David Long wrote:
On 08/15/2016 10:25 AM, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
On Fri, 12 Aug 2016 16:24:44 -0400
David Long wrote:
Some architectures (i.e.: sparc64 and arm64) make reasonable partial stack
duplication
On 08/15/2016 10:25 AM, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
On Fri, 12 Aug 2016 16:24:44 -0400
David Long wrote:
Some architectures (i.e.: sparc64 and arm64) make reasonable partial stack
duplication for jprobes problematic. Document this.
Applied to the docs tree, thanks.
jon
Was kind of hoping to
From: "David A. Long"
Some architectures (i.e.: sparc64 and arm64) make reasonable partial stack
duplication for jprobes problematic. Document this.
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
Documentation/kprobes.txt | 10 ++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/kprobes.
On 08/09/2016 01:23 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:29:05AM -0400, David Long wrote:
On 08/08/2016 07:13 AM, Daniel Thompson wrote:
On 04/08/16 05:47, David Long wrote:
>From b451caa1adaf1d03e08a44b5dad3fca31cebd97a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "David A. Lon
From: "David A. Long"
Because the arm64 calling standard allows stacked function arguments to be
anywhere in the stack frame, do not attempt to duplicate the stack frame for
jprobes handler functions.
Documenation changes to describe this issue have been broken out into a
separate patch in order
On 08/08/2016 07:13 AM, Daniel Thompson wrote:
On 04/08/16 05:47, David Long wrote:
From b451caa1adaf1d03e08a44b5dad3fca31cebd97a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "David A. Long"
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2016 00:35:33 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: Remove stack duplicating code from jprobes
B
On 07/29/2016 05:01 AM, Daniel Thompson wrote:
> On 28/07/16 15:40, Catalin Marinas wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 06:13:37PM -0400, David Long wrote:
>>> On 07/27/2016 07:50 AM, Daniel Thompson wrote:
>>>> On 25/07/16 23:27, David Long wrote:
>>>>>
On 07/27/2016 07:50 AM, Daniel Thompson wrote:
On 25/07/16 23:27, David Long wrote:
On 07/25/2016 01:13 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 11:51:32AM -0400, David Long wrote:
On 07/22/2016 06:16 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 02:33:52PM -0400, David Long
On 07/25/2016 01:13 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 11:51:32AM -0400, David Long wrote:
On 07/22/2016 06:16 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 02:33:52PM -0400, David Long wrote:
On 07/21/2016 01:23 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 21/07/16 17:33, David Long
On 07/22/2016 06:16 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 02:33:52PM -0400, David Long wrote:
On 07/21/2016 01:23 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 21/07/16 17:33, David Long wrote:
On 07/20/2016 12:09 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 08/07/16 17:35, David Long wrote:
+#define MAX_INSN_SIZE
On 07/21/2016 01:23 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 21/07/16 17:33, David Long wrote:
On 07/20/2016 12:09 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 08/07/16 17:35, David Long wrote:
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes
(jprobes) for ARM64.
Kprobes utilizes
On 07/20/2016 12:09 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 08/07/16 17:35, David Long wrote:
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes
(jprobes) for ARM64.
Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug
exceptions supported on ARM v8.
A software
On 07/20/2016 11:49 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:48PM -0400, David Long wrote:
+#define MIN_STACK_SIZE(addr) (on_irq_stack(addr, raw_smp_processor_id()) ? \
+ min((unsigned long)IRQ_STACK_SIZE, \
+ IRQ_STACK_PTR(raw_smp_processor_id()) - (addr
On 07/20/2016 05:36 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On 08/07/16 17:35, David Long wrote:
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes
(jprobes) for ARM64.
Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug
exceptions supported on ARM v8.
A software
On 07/19/2016 09:46 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:52PM -0400, David Long wrote:
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes_trampoline.S
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * trampoline entry and return code for kretprobes.
+ */
+
+#include
+#include
+#include
On 07/19/2016 02:27 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:44PM -0400, David Long wrote:
From: "David A. Long"
This patchset is heavily based on Sandeepa Prabhu's ARM v8 kprobes patches,
first seen in October 2013. This version attempts to address con
On 07/19/2016 09:57 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 05:22:08PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:44PM -0400, David Long wrote:
David A. Long (3):
arm64: Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature
arm64: Add more test functions to insn.c
On 07/15/2016 12:47 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:50PM -0400, David Long wrote:
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ tsk .reqx28 // current thread_info
* Exception vectors.
*/
+ .pushsection
On 07/15/2016 11:13 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 10:51:23AM -0400, David Long wrote:
On 07/15/2016 06:57 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:45PM -0400, David Long wrote:
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h
On 07/15/2016 06:57 AM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:45PM -0400, David Long wrote:
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
#define COMPAT_PT_DATA_ADDR 0x10004
#define COMPAT_PT_TEXT_END_ADDR
On 07/14/2016 12:22 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 12:35:44PM -0400, David Long wrote:
David A. Long (3):
arm64: Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature
arm64: Add more test functions to insn.c
arm64: add conditional instruction simulation support
Pratyush Anand
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes
(jprobes) for ARM64.
Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug
exceptions supported on ARM v8.
A software breakpoint is placed at the probe address to trap the
kernel execution into the kprobe ha
From: "David A. Long"
Cease using the arm32 arm_check_condition() function and replace it with
a local version for use in deprecated instruction support on arm64. Also
make the function table used by this available for future use by kprobes
and/or uprobes.
This function is derived from code writ
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Kprobes needs simulation of instructions that cannot be stepped
from a different memory location, e.g.: those instructions
that uses PC-relative addressing. In simulation, the behaviour
of the instruction is implemented using a copy of pt_regs.
The following instruction cat
From: "David A. Long"
Certain instructions are hard to execute correctly out-of-line (as in
kprobes). Test functions are added to insn.[hc] to identify these. The
instructions include any that use PC-relative addressing, change the PC,
or change interrupt masking. For efficiency and simplicity
From: Pratyush Anand
Add all function symbols which are called from do_debug_exception under
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL, as they can not kprobed.
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
---
arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 2 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 17 +
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Add info prints in sample kprobe handlers for ARM64
Signed-off-by: Sandeepa Prabhu
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
---
samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c | 9 +
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/samples/kprobes/kprobe_example.c
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
The pre-handler of this special 'trampoline' kprobe executes the return
probe handler functions and restores original return address in ELR_EL1.
This way the saved pt_regs still hold the original register context to be
carried back to the probed kernel function.
Signed-off-
From: "David A. Long"
This patchset is heavily based on Sandeepa Prabhu's ARM v8 kprobes patches,
first seen in October 2013. This version attempts to address concerns
raised by reviewers and also fixes problems discovered during testing.
This patchset adds support for kernel probes(kprobes), ju
From: Pratyush Anand
Entry symbols are not kprobe safe. So blacklist them for kprobing.
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
---
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 26 ++
a
From: William Cohen
The trampoline code is used by kretprobes to capture a return from a probed
function. This is done by saving the registers, calling the handler, and
restoring the registers. The code then returns to the original saved caller
return address. It is necessary to do this directly
From: "David A. Long"
Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature for arm64, including supporting
functions and defines.
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 52 ++
arch/arm64/ker
On 06/27/2016 02:57 AM, Pratyush Anand wrote:
Hi David,
On 26/06/2016:11:06:47 PM, David Long wrote:
From: Sandeepa Prabhu
Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes
(jprobes) for ARM64.
Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug
exceptions supported on ARM
From: "David A. Long"
Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature for arm64, including supporting
functions and defines.
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 52 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 118
From: Pratyush Anand
Entry symbols are not kprobe safe. So blacklist them for kprobing.
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand
Signed-off-by: David A. Long
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
---
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/kprobes/kprobes.c | 26 ++
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