Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX().
In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
disable stack protector for do_
On Thursday, July 18, 2024 03:04 EEST, Linus Torvalds
wrote:
> On Wed, 17 Jul 2024 at 15:24, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > > In particular, this patch would make it easy to make that
> > > SECURITY_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_FOLL_FORCE config option be a "choice"
> > > where you pick "never, ptrace, always"
On Thu, 18 Jul 2024 14:04:14 +0800 David Gow wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Jul 2024 at 05:22, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > Move the exec KUnit tests into a separate directory to avoid polluting
> > the local directory namespace. Additionally update MAINTAINERS for the
> > new files and mark myself as Maintain
Hi, Jinjie,
Thank you for your patch, but I think it is better to use drdtime()
instead of get_random_u16()? drdtime() is similar to rdtsc() of x86
which is defined in arch/loongarch/include/asm/loongarch.h.
Huacai
On Thu, Jul 18, 2024 at 8:42 PM Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>
> Add support of kernel sta
On 2024/7/19 9:22, Huacai Chen wrote:
> Hi, Jinjie,
>
> Thank you for your patch, but I think it is better to use drdtime()
> instead of get_random_u16()? drdtime() is similar to rdtsc() of x86
> which is defined in arch/loongarch/include/asm/loongarch.h.
Thank you, you are right.
"DRDTIME" c
Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX().
In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
disable stack protector for do_
