Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] exec: seal system mappings

2024-11-19 Thread Jeff Xu
Hi Lorenzo On Wed, Nov 13, 2024 at 12:47 PM Lorenzo Stoakes wrote: > > I'd prefer not to move forward with this until we have confirmation that > adequate testing has been performed, given how invasive this change is, > even if behind a flag (unless we explicitly mention it is untested in the > K

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] exec: seal system mappings

2024-11-19 Thread Jeff Xu
Hi Liam, On Wed, Nov 13, 2024 at 4:54 PM Liam R. Howlett wrote: > > Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not > > established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same > > as the process's lifetime [1]. It is sealed from creation. > > Why are you referencing ms

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] exec: seal system mappings

2024-11-13 Thread Liam R. Howlett
* jef...@chromium.org [241113 14:16]: > From: Jeff Xu Thanks, this looks much better. Some minor things below. > > Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall. > > Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect > them from ever changing or unmapped during the life tim

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] exec: seal system mappings

2024-11-13 Thread Lorenzo Stoakes
I'd prefer not to move forward with this until we have confirmation that adequate testing has been performed, given how invasive this change is, even if behind a flag (unless we explicitly mention it is untested in the Kconfig). We are touching arch-specific stuff with VDSO, VVAR, etc. so we need

[PATCH v3 1/1] exec: seal system mappings

2024-11-13 Thread jeffxu
From: Jeff Xu Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall. Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing or unmapped during the life time of the process. For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see mseal.rst [1]. System mappings such