On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 10:52:06AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>
>
> On 2024/7/20 0:01, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 11:14:27AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
> >> Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
> >> the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFS
On 2024/7/20 0:01, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 11:14:27AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>> Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
>> the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX().
>>
>> In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __built
On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 11:14:27AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
> Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
> the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX().
>
> In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
> slowing down the entry path
Applied with small changes, thanks.
https://github.com/chenhuacai/linux/commit/a55a07439613689f0890c9482b9c5f76dec255dd
Huacai
On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 11:09 AM Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>
> Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
> the offset is defaultly limited by KS
Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX().
In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
disable stack protector for do_
