On Wed, May 22, 2024, at 08:35, Nicolai Stange wrote:
> Kees Cook writes:
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>> b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>> index 5d868505a94e..6d92b68efbf6 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>> @@
Kees Cook writes:
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> index 5d868505a94e..6d92b68efbf6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
> if
On Sat, 09 Mar 2024 12:24:48 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> The kstack_offset variable was really only ever using the low bits for
> kernel stack offset entropy. Add a ror32() to increase bit diffusion.
>
>
Applied to for-next/hardening:
[1/1] randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion
https:
The kstack_offset variable was really only ever using the low bits for
kernel stack offset entropy. Add a ror32() to increase bit diffusion.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann
Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each
syscall")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
---
Cc: Jeremy L
