On Tuesday, May 14, 2024 02:50 EEST, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 03, 2024 at 11:57:56AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 04:10:49PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 08:57:49PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> > > > Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /p
On Saturday, April 27, 2024 02:10 EEST, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 08:57:49PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> > Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc//mem was restricted,
> > after which it got allowed in commit 198214a7ee50 ("proc: enable
> > writing to /proc/pid/mem"). Famous last
On Fri, May 03, 2024 at 11:57:56AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 04:10:49PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 08:57:49PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> > > Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc//mem was restricted,
> > > after which it got allowed in com
On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 04:10:49PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 08:57:49PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> > Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc//mem was restricted,
> > after which it got allowed in commit 198214a7ee50 ("proc: enable
> > writing to /proc/pid/mem"). Famous last
On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 08:57:49PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc//mem was restricted,
> after which it got allowed in commit 198214a7ee50 ("proc: enable
> writing to /proc/pid/mem"). Famous last words from that patch:
> "no longer a security hazard". :)
>
> Af
Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc//mem was restricted,
after which it got allowed in commit 198214a7ee50 ("proc: enable
writing to /proc/pid/mem"). Famous last words from that patch:
"no longer a security hazard". :)
Afterwards exploits started causing drama like [1]. The exploits
using /proc
