> diff --git a/include/xen/balloon.h b/include/xen/balloon.h
> index 4914b93a23f2..a72ef3f88b39 100644
> --- a/include/xen/balloon.h
> +++ b/include/xen/balloon.h
> @@ -28,14 +28,6 @@ int alloc_xenballooned_pages(int nr_pages, struct page
> **pages);
> void free_xenballooned_pages(int nr_pages,
On 10/9/18 6:54 AM, Juergen Gross wrote:
> +
> +u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void)
> +{
> + return boot_params.hdr.acpi_rsdp_addr;
> +}
Should we then update init_pvh_bootparams() with
pvh_bootparams.hdr.acpi_rsdp_addr = pvh_start_info.rsdp_paddr;
(and drop x86_init.acpi.get_root_po
>>
>> PV guests don't go through Linux x86 early boot code. They start at
>> xen_start_kernel() (well, xen-head.S:startup_xen(), really) and merge
>> with baremetal path at x86_64_start_reservations() (for 64-bit).
>>
>
> Ok, I don't think anything needs to be done then. The sme_me_mask is set
>
On 06/09/2017 02:36 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>> On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>> On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>>>>>> What
On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV
>>>> guests.
>>>
>>> And that may be something that Xen will need t
>
>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV
>> guests.
>
> And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either
> CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests.
Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 years old) leaf
0x8007 is passed to
On 06/07/2017 03:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates
> the PGD is encrypted. The encryption bit should not be used when creating
> a virtual address for the PGD table.
>
> Create a new function, read_cr3_pa(), that will extract the
llow GDT remapping in the Fixmap section. The current
> MODULES_END static address does not provide enough space for the kernel
> to support a large number of processors.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier
For Xen bits (and to some extent bare-metal):
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Boris Ostro
On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
+void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned long addr = memory_rand_start;
+ unsigned long padding, rand, mem_tb;
+ struct rnd_state rnd_st;
+ unsigned long remain_padding = memory_rand_end - me
