Re: [RFC v5 02/38] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 64K backed HPTE pages

2017-07-10 Thread Balbir Singh
On Wed, 5 Jul 2017 14:21:39 -0700 Ram Pai wrote: > Rearrange 64K PTE bits to free up bits 3, 4, 5 and 6 > in the 64K backed HPTE pages. This along with the earlier > patch will entirely free up the four bits from 64K PTE. > The bit numbers are big-endian as defined in the ISA3.0 > > Th

Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature

2017-07-10 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 01:07:46AM -0400, Brian Gerst wrote: > > If I make the scattered feature support conditional on CONFIG_X86_64 > > (based on comment below) then cpu_has() will always be false unless > > CONFIG_X86_64 is enabled. So this won't need to be wrapped by the > > #ifdef. > > If you

Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature

2017-07-10 Thread Brian Gerst
On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 3:41 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 7/8/2017 7:50 AM, Brian Gerst wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:38 AM, Tom Lendacky >> wrote: >>> >>> Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the >>> Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by

Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()

2017-07-10 Thread Brian Gerst
On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 3:50 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 7/8/2017 7:57 AM, Brian Gerst wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky >> wrote: >>> >>> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA >>> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is

Re: [v3 2/6] mm, oom: cgroup-aware OOM killer

2017-07-10 Thread David Rientjes
On Wed, 21 Jun 2017, Roman Gushchin wrote: > Traditionally, the OOM killer is operating on a process level. > Under oom conditions, it finds a process with the highest oom score > and kills it. > > This behavior doesn't suit well the system with many running > containers. There are two main issue

Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()

2017-07-10 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 7/8/2017 7:57 AM, Brian Gerst wrote: On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pa

Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature

2017-07-10 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 7/8/2017 7:50 AM, Brian Gerst wrote: On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:38 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID 0x801f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of M

Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)

2017-07-10 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 7/8/2017 4:24 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote: * Tom Lendacky wrote: This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. I'm wondering, what's the typical performance hit to DRAM access latency when SME is enabled? It's about an extra 10 cycles of DRAM lat

Re: [RFC v5 00/38] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys

2017-07-10 Thread Ram Pai
On Sun, Jul 09, 2017 at 11:05:44PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote: > On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 11:13:23AM +0530, Anshuman Khandual wrote: > > On 07/06/2017 02:51 AM, Ram Pai wrote: . > > > do you have data points to show the difference in > > performance between this version and the last one where > > we