Daniel P. Berrangé:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:33:00PM +0000, procmem wrote:
>> Hello. I'm a distro maintainer and was wondering about the efficacy of
>> entropy daemons like haveged and jitterentropyd in qemu-kvm. One of the
>> authors of haveged [0] pointed out if t
Martin Kletzander:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:33:00PM +0000, procmem wrote:
>> Hello. I'm a distro maintainer and was wondering about the efficacy of
>> entropy daemons like haveged and jitterentropyd in qemu-kvm. One of the
>> authors of haveged [0] pointed out if t
Hello. I'm a distro maintainer and was wondering about the efficacy of
entropy daemons like haveged and jitterentropyd in qemu-kvm. One of the
authors of haveged [0] pointed out if the hardware cycles counter is
emulated and deterministic, and thus predictible. He therefore does not
recommend using
Hello. I'm interested in running guests as read-only to turn them into a
sort of virtualized "live=cd". The goal is to leave no forensic evidence
on the host disk or virtual one which would lead to traces on the host
still- similar to how TAILS works but with the added convenince and
flexibility of
Hi. What are the security implications for the host when using direct
kernel boot for guests that are potentially malicious? Is guest
filesystem data saved to an emulated drive or directly on the host? [0]
Direct boot seems like an otherwise more efficient way to do things.
[0] It was discovered t
Daniel P. Berrangé:
> On Sat, May 19, 2018 at 12:42:14AM +0000, procmem wrote:
>> Hi I'm a privacy distro maintainer investigating the implications of the
>> newly published nethammer attack [0] on KVM guests particularly the
>> virtio-net drivers. The summary of the p
Hi I'm a privacy distro maintainer investigating the implications of the
newly published nethammer attack [0] on KVM guests particularly the
virtio-net drivers. The summary of the paper is that rowhammer can be
remotely triggered by feeding susceptible* network driver crafted
traffic. This attack c
Daniel P. Berrangé:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:13:46PM +0000, procmem wrote:
>> Where can I find the full list of libvirt supported qemu-ga commands?
>> The docs [0] imply virDomainQemuAgentCommand bypasses libvirt and is not
>> recommended.
>>
>> I am look
procmem:
> Where can I find the full list of libvirt supported qemu-ga commands?
> The docs [0] imply virDomainQemuAgentCommand bypasses libvirt and is not
> recommended.
>
> I am looking to pass suspend/resume events from the host to the guest
> and then have the guest act
Where can I find the full list of libvirt supported qemu-ga commands?
The docs [0] imply virDomainQemuAgentCommand bypasses libvirt and is not
recommended.
I am looking to pass suspend/resume events from the host to the guest
and then have the guest act on this internally. Your help is appreciated
Hi. Is it still considered risky to use the QEMU guest agent in an
untrusted guest? A warning on these lines was written in the manual a
few years back when the feature made its debut. I wanted to know if it
was hardened since.
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