Jan Kiszka siemens.com> writes:
>
> On 2014-07-28 23:17, Nakajima, Jun wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Paolo Bonzini
redhat.com> wrote:
> >> Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto:
> >>> The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU
> >>> state. Only protec
On 2014-07-28 23:17, Nakajima, Jun wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto:
>>> The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU
>>> state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient.
>>>
>
On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto:
>> The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU
>> state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient.
>>
>> We rather need encryption of every data that l
Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto:
> The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU
> state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient.
>
> We rather need encryption of every data that leaves the CPU or moves
> from guest to host mode (and decryp
On 2014-07-28 19:17, Joel Schopp wrote:
>
> On 07/25/2014 03:11 PM, Shiva V wrote:
>> Hello,
>> I am exploring on finding a way to ensure runtime integrity of
>>
>> a executable in untrusted hypervisors.
>>
>> In particular, this is my requirements:
>>
>> 1. I have a 2 virtual machines. (A, B).
On 07/25/2014 03:11 PM, Shiva V wrote:
> Hello,
> I am exploring on finding a way to ensure runtime integrity of
>
> a executable in untrusted hypervisors.
>
> In particular, this is my requirements:
>
> 1. I have a 2 virtual machines. (A, B).
>
> 2. VM-A is running some service (exe) inside it.
On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 2:06 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>
>> Thanks a lot Paolo.
>>
>> Is there a way to atleast detect that the hypervisor has done something
>> malicious and the client will be able to refer to some kind of logs to
>> prove it?
>
> If you want a theoretical, perfect solution, no.
> Thanks a lot Paolo.
>
> Is there a way to atleast detect that the hypervisor has done something
> malicious and the client will be able to refer to some kind of logs to
> prove it?
If you want a theoretical, perfect solution, no. I wouldn't be surprised
if this is equivalent to the halting pr
Il 25/07/2014 22:11, Shiva V ha scritto:
> 5. Underlying hypervisor is untrusted.
>
> Can anyone please shed any direction to proceed.I am stuck here.
> Anytime I try to make a progress, I get back to the loop where
> vcpu and the address translations from the guest virtual pages to host
> physic
Hello,
I am exploring on finding a way to ensure runtime integrity of
a executable in untrusted hypervisors.
In particular, this is my requirements:
1. I have a 2 virtual machines. (A, B).
2. VM-A is running some service (exe) inside it. For example any resource
accounting service intended
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