Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-27 Thread Roland C. Dowdeswell
On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 07:08:38AM -0500, Ben H wrote: > > Thanks all. Continued appreciation for your contributions and guidance. Although I am not sure if it influenced the original design decisions, there are also some operational benefits. At a lot of companies, you may have different teams

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-26 Thread Ben H
Thanks all. Continued appreciation for your contributions and guidance. On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 10:29 AM, Greg Hudson wrote: > On 04/24/2015 06:05 PM, Ben H wrote: > > So from a privilege separation perspective, are we talking more from a > > hardening perspective? E.g. if I can compromise ser

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-25 Thread Greg Hudson
On 04/24/2015 06:05 PM, Ben H wrote: > So from a privilege separation perspective, are we talking more from a > hardening perspective? E.g. if I can compromise serviceA that would > give me the key to serviceB? Yes. > While that is a valid concern - if we were to guarantee (theoretically) > that

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Nico Williams
On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 05:05:32PM -0500, Ben H wrote: > Nico - I'm not sure I understand your redirection statement. Is this from > a "man-in-the-middle" type perspective? The fact that each application > communicates over a specific port would be enough to direct to the correct > service, no?

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Ben H
Thanks Simo - I think that your explanation mostly answers the first part from my reply! On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Ben H wrote: > Greg - > > So from a privilege separation perspective, are we talking more from a > hardening perspective? E.g. if I can compromise serviceA that would give >

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Ben H
Greg - So from a privilege separation perspective, are we talking more from a hardening perspective? E.g. if I can compromise serviceA that would give me the key to serviceB? While that is a valid concern - if we were to guarantee (theoretically) that serviceA couldn't be breached (or there was a

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Simo Sorce
On Fri, 2015-04-24 at 16:46 -0400, Greg Hudson wrote: > On 04/24/2015 03:37 PM, Ben H wrote: > > Why not simply use host/serverA.domain.com for both services? > > At a protocol level, it's to support privilege separation on the server. > The CIFS server doesn't need access to the LDAP server key

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Nico Williams
On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 04:46:55PM -0400, Greg Hudson wrote: > On 04/24/2015 03:37 PM, Ben H wrote: > > Why not simply use host/serverA.domain.com for both services? > > At a protocol level, it's to support privilege separation on the server. > The CIFS server doesn't need access to the LDAP serv

Re: theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Greg Hudson
On 04/24/2015 03:37 PM, Ben H wrote: > Why not simply use host/serverA.domain.com for both services? At a protocol level, it's to support privilege separation on the server. The CIFS server doesn't need access to the LDAP server key and vice versa. Of course you only get this benefit if (a) the

theory behind unique SPNs

2015-04-24 Thread Ben H
I've worked with Kerberos implementations for a while, but almost exclusively with AD in the KDC role (though MIT clients as well). This may sound like a beginner question because of my lack of experience with "pure" Kerberos. When accessing services we require a service ticket for each principal,