Hi John
“My current understanding is that many European governments are planning to use
FrodoKEM as the main quantum-resistant algorithm for ephemeral-ephemeral key
exchange for their national security systems”
This is not the sentiment that I am picking up – perhaps I speak to different
gover
>There are a number of updates to government guidance in the works.
I am aware and I am looking forward to these. Current public documentation and
presentations from European countries has been very useful, especially
documents co-authored by several countries like this
https://www.forsvarsmakten
Dear Daniel,
Thank you for sharing this work. I appreciate the thought you've put into
it, and it provides us with a good starting point for further development.
I have found some points for discussion
1. the Strata
In your document, you need 3 strata to compress the complete stack. And
anywhere i
Hello ipsecme,
Regarding draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2, I am interested to know whether the
following instantiation of the draft seems reasonable- it isn't explicitly
provisioned for in the draft, but I don't see any issues that would prevent it
from working.
In a scenario where a traditional
On Thu, 23 Jan 2025, Rebecca Guthrie wrote:
In a scenario where a traditional key establishment algorithm is used in
IKE_SA_INIT and ML-KEM is used in
IKE_INTERMEDIATE, the draft implies (but does not require) that when rekeying
or creating a child SA, the
traditional algorithm would be used a
Dear WG Chairs,
This is a friendly nudge for your response, as the re-chartering process seems
to have progressed.
Could you please let us know the next steps? Would the WG Chairs
consider issuing a call for WG adoption of this document?
The draft is ready to proceed, and there has been support
