HI Scott,
> Sorry if I ask such an obvious question, but would McEliece perform better
> against packet loss if we introduce
> a more intelligent ack/retry method? For each, the ack would list which
> segments of the packet have been
> received (e.g. bytes 0-3240 and bytes 6780-9800), so that o
Hi Stefan, Daniel,
> Hi,
>
> the fact is that accepting a significantly increased amount of data from an
> unauthenticated peer also
> significantly increases the surface to DoS attacks. Even without surpassing
> the 64KB limit, this must be a
> concern. IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try
Daniel Herzinger writes:
> the fact is that accepting a significantly increased amount of data
> from an unauthenticated peer also significantly increases the
> surface to DoS attacks.
Accepting data is not a DoS attack problem.
If the other end sends you lots of packets, you will have to cope wi
