Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection

2021-10-26 Thread Daniel Herzinger
Hi, the fact is that accepting a significantly increased amount of data from an unauthenticated peer also significantly increases the surface to DoS attacks. Even without surpassing the 64KB limit, this must be a concern. IKEv2's cookie mechanism and puzzles try to increase the cost of the att

Re: [IPsec] WGLC for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev1-algo-to-historic (fwd)

2021-10-26 Thread Michael Richardson
Paul Wouters wrote: >> On 6/28/21 1:23 AM, Valery Smyslov wrote: >>> - Is it OK that the intended status is Standards Track? Shouldn't it be >>> BCP? > I think because it contains IANA actions, it should be Standards Track. Agreed. (It would be funny for it to be Historic, but

Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection

2021-10-26 Thread Kampanakis, Panos
Hi Daniel, > To give more insight about these measurements, we implemented all three > drafts and tested the performance of a medium-sized McEliece key exchange > under different networking conditions (variable latency, packet loss, and > throughput). Especially when packet loss or throughput