Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection

2021-10-21 Thread Kampanakis, Panos
Hi Valery, Tero, > Not really. First, the situation with seven McEliece is not possible, since > all negotiated Key Exchange methods MUST be different. Then, you seem to assume that the responder blindly accepts all the key exchanges at the initiator's will. This is not true. First peers negoti

Re: [IPsec] Cost-efficient quantum-resistant DoS protection

2021-10-21 Thread CJ Tjhai
Hi Panos, There are two drafts involved here. a) the main draft, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke/, cannot support any public-key larger than 64KB, so it can never be used for KEMs like McEliece. So the option 3 is implied here. b) on the other hand, https://