Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)

2021-03-04 Thread Tero Kivinen
Dan Harkins writes: > If an individual draft was to appear would the WG adopt it as a work item? Can't say what WG would decide, but I would support such work, and would be willing to start a process to adding such item to charter if WG feels that is something we want to do. -- kivi...@iki.fi _

Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)

2021-03-04 Thread Dan Brown
Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a job for CFRG! As I understand it, OCB2 is severely broken: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311 That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be just fine, but a broken OCB2 is not a good sign. All the more reason to defer to CFRG, unless you want to play Monty Hall

Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)

2021-03-04 Thread Dan Harkins
  Hi Dan, On 3/4/21 11:04 AM, Dan Brown wrote: Deciding whether to use OCB sounds like a job for CFRG! As I understand it, OCB2 is severely broken: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311 That said, OCB1 and OCB3 may be just fine, but a broken OCB2 is not a good sign.  All the more reason to def

Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)

2021-03-04 Thread Dan Brown
Sorry for foolishly forgetting about the OCB RFC, which specifies OCB3. But that OCB3 RFC is from 2014, five-ish years before the OCB2 break. Again, the OCB2 attack severely erodes my trust in OCB3, though maybe I'm an outlier. Maybe I'm also forgetting recent CFRG or other effort to regain trus

Re: [IPsec] [Cryptography] Direct public confirmation from Dr. Rogaway (fwd)

2021-03-04 Thread Dan Harkins
On 3/4/21 4:46 PM, Dan Brown wrote: Sorry for foolishly forgetting about the OCB RFC, which specifies OCB3. But that OCB3 RFC is from 2014, five-ish years before the OCB2 break.   It says: "The version of OCB defined in this document is a refinement of two    prior schemes.  The original OCB