Michael Richardson writes:
> Unless we can convince various people otherwise, the TA will all be
> private enterprise/ISP CAs.
And for some reason those same private enterprise/ISP people are
exactly those who say that we can't leak our CA certificates out, and
thats why we can't have publicly ava
Valery Smyslov writes:
> > I think examples of where DN would not be sufficient (and its in the -25
> > text) would be expired certs from the correct CA, or certs from
> > a misconfigured registrar with CA - where the operator unintentionally
> > re-created a CA with the same DN, instead of going t
On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 04:40:53PM +0300, Tero Kivinen wrote:
> Michael Richardson writes:
> > Unless we can convince various people otherwise, the TA will all be
> > private enterprise/ISP CAs.
>
> And for some reason those same private enterprise/ISP people are
> exactly those who say that we ca
