On Wed, 25 Dec 2019, Valery Smyslov wrote:
Uri, I don't mind referencing NIST levels, but I'd like to first hear from my
co-authors,
who are definitely more experienced in cryptography and in NIST levels than I
am :-)
I don't think mentioning the NIST competition is useful. Per definition,
On Wed, 25 Dec 2019, Valery Smyslov wrote:
Another approach - use some new status notification containing
seclabel that the initiator would include in any request to create
Child SA. This is easy to implement, but there is a possibility,
that unsupporting responder will just ignore this notifica
To make sure we mention the NIST PQ Level categorization (that will not
change as the NIST PQ Project progresses), I was thinking we could add
something in the Sec Considerations section like
[...] Because of
this, the user SHOULD ensure that the post-quantum preshared key used
has at le
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of
the IETF.
Title : Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum
Resistance
Authors : Scott Fluhrer
Hi,
the -10 version of the draft addresses comments received during IETF LC and
IANA review.
Regards,
Valery.
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of
> the IETF.
>
>
Hi Paul,
> > Another approach - use some new status notification containing
> > seclabel that the initiator would include in any request to create
> > Child SA. This is easy to implement, but there is a possibility,
> > that unsupporting responder will just ignore this notification
> > and create
