[IPsec] More Issues for IKEv2bis

2010-02-09 Thread Tero Kivinen
Yoav Nir writes: > Issue #159 - Payload processing order within messages > = > (3.1) Clarify that the text: > ... > Payloads are identified in the order in which >they appear in an IKE message by looking in the "Next Payl

Re: [IPsec] Fwd: Issue : Regarding EAP identity

2010-02-09 Thread Alper Yegin
Dan, I'm not aware of any such document. Alper > -Original Message- > From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dhark...@lounge.org] > Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 8:13 PM > To: Alper Yegin > Cc: 'Yoav Nir'; 'Raj Singh'; 'Yaron Sheffer'; 'ipsec' > Subject: Re: [IPsec] Fwd: Issue : Regarding EAP iden

Re: [IPsec] Closing issue #143 (rewrite of section 1.5)

2010-02-09 Thread Tero Kivinen
Paul Hoffman writes: > At 2:07 PM +0200 2/8/10, Tero Kivinen wrote: > >Paul Hoffman writes: > >>In the first case, if the receiving node has an active IKE SA to the > >>IP address from whence the packet came, it MAY send an INVALID_SPI > >>notification of the wayward packet over that IK

[IPsec] Issue #154, was RE: Yet another closing session - issues #153-#157

2010-02-09 Thread Tero Kivinen
Yaron Sheffer writes: > Going back to the original issue: there is no interoperable way to > send "generic dummy packets". True, and that is ok. This dummy packet does NOT require any processing from the other end except that some ESP packet needs to be sent, so other end knows that initiator has

Re: [IPsec] Issue #175: Better wording for NAT mobility issues

2010-02-09 Thread Tero Kivinen
Raj Singh writes: > Suppose responder got IKE_AUTH request (NIP1, NP1), and now mapping got > removed at NAT box. > If responder will send packet to packet to last integrity protected packet > i.e. IKE_AUTH request. No. Section 3.1 clearly says that ALL ike response messages are always replied bac

Re: [IPsec] Fwd: Issue : Regarding EAP identity

2010-02-09 Thread Dan Harkins
Hi Alper, In that case there is no standard way for the AAA server to inform the IKEv2 responder of this "policy" that it needs to enforce. So that sounds unworkable. The IKEv2 responder already has the mechanisms in place to enforce a policy based on the authenticated identity of the IKEv

[IPsec] WG Review: Recharter of IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (ipsecme)

2010-02-09 Thread IESG Secretary
A modified charter has been submitted for the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (ipsecme) working group in the Security Area of the IETF. The IESG has not made any determination as yet. The modified charter is provided below for informational purposes only. Please send your comments to the