RFCs 4753 and 5114 provide vague recommendations for choice of
Diffie-Hellman group relative to symmetric key sizes. They don't
specifically address how to look at a set of chosen SA encryption and
authentication algorithms and arrive at a choice of suitable
Diffie-Hellman group, nor do they a
_
From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Scott C Moonen
Sent: Monday, June 29, 2009 12:30 PM
To: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [IPsec] guidelines for choice of D-H group
RFCs 4753 and 5114 provide vague recommendations for choice of
Diffie-Hellman group
Scott, thank you. How dense of me! Doubling the work effort is
equivalent to adding one bit to the effective strength, not doubling the
number of bits.
Scott Moonen (smoo...@us.ibm.com)
z/OS Communications Server TCP/IP Development
http://scott.andstuff.org/
http://www.linkedin.com/in/smoonen
At 3:51 PM -0400 6/26/09, Scott C Moonen wrote:
>ikev2bis says the following:
>
> SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei, and SK_er are computed from SKEYSEED as
> specified in Section 2.14.
>
>Is it correct to assume that SPIi and SPIr as used in this rekey calculation
>are from the new, rekeyed IKE SA?
