Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods

2009-05-13 Thread Stephen Kent
At 9:34 PM +0530 5/12/09, Murthy N Srinivas-B22237 wrote: Is there a new draft/rfc posted with the change incorporated? -ns murthy DES is deprecated, so I would not expect a revised RFC on that. AES is strongly preferred over 3DES, so there is little incentive to rev that doc, although it m

Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods

2009-05-12 Thread Murthy N Srinivas-B22237
Is there a new draft/rfc posted with the change incorporated? -ns murthy From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of Stephen Kent Sent: Tue 5/12/2009 8:39 PM To: Murthy N Srinivas-B22237 Cc: ipsec@ietf.org Subject: Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES

Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods

2009-05-12 Thread Stephen Kent
2405 is out of date. Its recommendation re using the last 8 octets of ciphertext from the previous packet has been replaced with one of using a randomly-generated IV for each packet. Steve ___ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mai

Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods

2009-05-12 Thread Scott Fluhrer
> -Original Message- > From: Yoav Nir [mailto:y...@checkpoint.com] > Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2009 3:42 AM > To: ssmurthy.nitt...@freescale.com > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods > > On Tue, 2009-05-12 at 10:05

Re: [IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods

2009-05-12 Thread Yoav Nir
WARNING: contains banned part --- Begin Message --- On Tue, 2009-05-12 at 10:05 +, ss murthy nittala wrote: > Hi > > Thanks for the clarifications regarding IV usage for AES methods. > > RFC 2405 (DES) in its implementation note says > > "Common practice is to use random data for the first I

[IPsec] IV in ESP packets for DES and 3DES methods

2009-05-12 Thread ss murthy nittala
Hi Thanks for the clarifications regarding IV usage for AES methods. RFC 2405 (DES) in its implementation note says "Common practice is to use random data for the first IV and the last 8 octets of encrypted data from an encryption process as the IV for the next encryption process; this logic