On 12/12/24 17:30, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 11:56 AM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
Hey Luto!
Let me try to address your concerns below.
On 11/18/24 15:02, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:12 AM James Bottomley
wrote:
On Mon, 2024-11-18 at 10:43 -0800, Andy
On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 11:56 AM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
>
> Hey Luto!
>
> Let me try to address your concerns below.
>
> On 11/18/24 15:02, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:12 AM James Bottomley
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, 2024-11-18 at 10:43 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
Hey Luto!
Let me try to address your concerns below.
On 11/18/24 15:02, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:12 AM James Bottomley
wrote:
On Mon, 2024-11-18 at 10:43 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
Linux should not use TPM2_PCR_Extend *at all*. Instead, Linux should
exclusively
On 11/21/24 2:42 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:54 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:11 PM wrote:
On 11/18/24 12:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
If the vendor of an attestation-dependent thing trusts SM3 but *Linux*
does not like SM3, then the vend
On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:54 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:11 PM wrote:
> >
> > On 11/18/24 12:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> > > If the vendor of an attestation-dependent thing trusts SM3 but *Linux*
> > > does not like SM3, then the vendor's software should not be
On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:11 PM wrote:
>
> On 11/18/24 12:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > If the vendor of an attestation-dependent thing trusts SM3 but *Linux*
> > does not like SM3, then the vendor's software should not become wildly
> > insecure because Linux does not like SM3. And, as tha
On 11/18/24 12:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:12 AM James Bottomley
wrote:
On Mon, 2024-11-18 at 10:43 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
Linux should not use TPM2_PCR_Extend *at all*. Instead, Linux should
exclusively use TPM2_PCR_Event. I would expect that passing, sa
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:12 AM James Bottomley
wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2024-11-18 at 10:43 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > Linux should not use TPM2_PCR_Extend *at all*. Instead, Linux should
> > exclusively use TPM2_PCR_Event. I would expect that passing, say,
> > the entire kernel image to TPM2
On Mon, 2024-11-18 at 10:43 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Linux should not use TPM2_PCR_Extend *at all*. Instead, Linux should
> exclusively use TPM2_PCR_Event. I would expect that passing, say,
> the entire kernel image to TPM2_PCR_Event would be a big mistake, so
> instead Linux should hash t
On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 10:43 AM Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Linux should not use TPM2_PCR_Extend *at all*. Instead, Linux should
> exclusively use TPM2_PCR_Event. I would expect that passing, say, the
> entire kernel image to TPM2_PCR_Event would be a big mistake, so
> instead Linux should hash
On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 5:17 PM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
>
> On 11/2/24 12:04, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Sat, 2024-11-02 at 10:53 -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> >> Hi Luto,
> >>
> >> My apologies, I missed this response and the active on v11 cause me
> >> to
> >> get an inquiry why I hadn't res
On 11/2/24 12:04, James Bottomley wrote:
On Sat, 2024-11-02 at 10:53 -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
Hi Luto,
My apologies, I missed this response and the active on v11 cause me
to
get an inquiry why I hadn't responded.
On 9/21/24 18:40, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
[...]
I assumed that "deliberatel
On Sat, 2024-11-02 at 10:53 -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> Hi Luto,
>
> My apologies, I missed this response and the active on v11 cause me
> to
> get an inquiry why I hadn't responded.
>
> On 9/21/24 18:40, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
[...]
> > I assumed that "deliberately cap" meant that there was
Hi Luto,
My apologies, I missed this response and the active on v11 cause me to
get an inquiry why I hadn't responded.
On 9/21/24 18:40, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Sat, Sep 21, 2024 at 11:37 AM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
On 9/13/24 23:57, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 5:34 PM
On Sat, Sep 21, 2024 at 11:37 AM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
>
> On 9/13/24 23:57, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 5:34 PM Daniel P. Smith
> > wrote:
> >>
> > What, exactly, is your patchset doing that requires hashing at all?
> > (I assume it's extending a PCR and generating an ev
On 9/13/24 23:57, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 5:34 PM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
Hey again,
On 9/4/24 21:01, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
Hi Luto.
On 8/28/24 23:17, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15, 2024 at 12:10 PM Thomas Gleixner
wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Dani
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 5:34 PM Daniel P. Smith
wrote:
>
> Hey again,
>
> On 9/4/24 21:01, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> > Hi Luto.
> >
> > On 8/28/24 23:17, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Thu, Aug 15, 2024 at 12:10 PM Thomas Gleixner
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smi
Hey again,
On 9/4/24 21:01, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
Hi Luto.
On 8/28/24 23:17, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15, 2024 at 12:10 PM Thomas Gleixner
wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Eric Biggers writes:
That paragraph
Hi Luto.
On 8/28/24 23:17, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15, 2024 at 12:10 PM Thomas Gleixner wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Eric Biggers writes:
That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd pr
On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 8:25 PM Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 08:17:05PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> > Ross et al, can you confirm that your code actually, at least by
> > default and with a monstrous warning to anyone who tries to change the
> > default, caps SHA1 PCRs
On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 08:17:05PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Ross et al, can you confirm that your code actually, at least by
> default and with a monstrous warning to anyone who tries to change the
> default, caps SHA1 PCRs if SHA256 is available? And then can we maybe
> all stop hassling
On Thu, Aug 15, 2024 at 12:10 PM Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> > On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> Eric Biggers writes:
> >>> That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to
> >>> use
> >>> SHA-256-only".
On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 01:14:45PM -0700, ross.philip...@oracle.com wrote:
> On 8/27/24 11:14 AM, 'Eric Biggers' via trenchboot-devel wrote:
> > On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 07:16:56PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
> > > > From: "Daniel
On 8/27/24 11:14 AM, 'Eric Biggers' via trenchboot-devel wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 07:16:56PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
From: "Daniel P. Smith"
For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
choice of hashe
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 07:16:56PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
> > From: "Daniel P. Smith"
> >
> > For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
> > choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
>
On 8/15/24 15:10, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Eric Biggers writes:
That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to use
SHA-256-only". That implies that you do not, in fact, pr
On Mon Aug 19, 2024 at 9:24 PM EEST, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 09:05:47PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri Aug 16, 2024 at 9:41 PM EEST, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 02:22:04PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > >
> > > > For (any) non-legacy fe
On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 09:05:47PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri Aug 16, 2024 at 9:41 PM EEST, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 02:22:04PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >
> > > For (any) non-legacy features we can choose, which choices we choose to
> > > support, and wh
On Fri Aug 16, 2024 at 9:41 PM EEST, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 02:22:04PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>
> > For (any) non-legacy features we can choose, which choices we choose to
> > support, and which we do not. This is not an oppositive view just saying
> > how it is, an
On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 02:22:04PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> For (any) non-legacy features we can choose, which choices we choose to
> support, and which we do not. This is not an oppositive view just saying
> how it is, and platforms set of choices is not a selling argument.
NIST still per
On Fri Aug 16, 2024 at 2:01 PM EEST, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 15/08/2024 8:10 pm, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> >> On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >>> Eric Biggers writes:
> That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Ev
On 15/08/2024 8:10 pm, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
>> On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Eric Biggers writes:
That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to
use
SHA-256-only". That implies tha
On Thu Aug 15, 2024 at 10:10 PM EEST, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> > On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> Eric Biggers writes:
> >>> That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to
> >>> use
> >>> SHA-256-only
On Thu, Aug 15 2024 at 13:38, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Eric Biggers writes:
>>> That paragraph is also phrased as a hypothetical, "Even if we'd prefer to
>>> use
>>> SHA-256-only". That implies that you do not, in fact, prefer SHA-256 only.
>>> Is
On 5/31/24 09:54, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Eric Biggers writes:
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
From: "Daniel P. Smith"
For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
software, an
On Wed Jun 5, 2024 at 12:02 AM EEST, wrote:
> On 6/4/24 11:52 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> >> From: "Daniel P. Smith"
> >>
> >> For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
> >> choice of hashes used lie with the pl
On 6/4/24 11:52 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
From: "Daniel P. Smith"
For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
software, and is often outside of the use
On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> From: "Daniel P. Smith"
>
> For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
> choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
> software, and is often outside of the users control.
>
> Even if we'd prefer t
On 5/30/24 7:16 PM, Eric Biggers wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
From: "Daniel P. Smith"
For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
software, and is often outside of the u
Eric Biggers writes:
> On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> From: "Daniel P. Smith"
>>
>> For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
>> choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
>> software, and is often outside of the user
On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 06:03:18PM -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
> From: "Daniel P. Smith"
>
> For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
> choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
> software, and is often outside of the users control.
>
> Even if we'd p
From: "Daniel P. Smith"
For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. The
choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
software, and is often outside of the users control.
Even if we'd prefer to use SHA-256-only, if firmware elected to start us
with the SHA-1 and
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