On Fri, 13 May 2016 06:50:25 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 1:33 PM
> > > >
> > > > As argued previously in this thread, there's nothing special about a
> > > > DMA write to memory versus a DMA write to a s
From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> Sent: 13 May 2016 06:33
...
> Simply denying direct writes to the vector table or preventing mapping
> of the vector table into the user address space does not provide any
> tangible form of protection. Many devices make use of window reg
> From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 1:33 PM
> > >
> > > As argued previously in this thread, there's nothing special about a
> > > DMA write to memory versus a DMA write to a special address that
> > > triggers an MSI vector. If the device is DM
On Fri, 13 May 2016 02:33:18 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 1:48 AM
> >
> > On Thu, 12 May 2016 04:53:19 +
> > "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> >
> > > > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.co
> From: Tian, Kevin
> Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 10:33 AM
>
> > means. The MSI-X vector table of a device is always considered
> > untrusted which is why we require user opt-ins to subvert that
> > protection. Thanks,
> >
>
> I only partially agree with this statement since there is different
>
> From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Friday, May 13, 2016 1:48 AM
>
> On Thu, 12 May 2016 04:53:19 +
> "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
>
> > > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > > Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2016 10:21 AM
> > >
> > > On Thu, 12 May
On Thu, 12 May 2016 04:53:19 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2016 10:21 AM
> >
> > On Thu, 12 May 2016 01:19:44 +
> > "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> >
> > > > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat
> From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2016 10:21 AM
>
> On Thu, 12 May 2016 01:19:44 +
> "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
>
> > > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 11:54 PM
> > >
> > > On Wed, 11
On Thu, 12 May 2016 01:19:44 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 11:54 PM
> >
> > On Wed, 11 May 2016 06:29:06 +
> > "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> >
> > > > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redha
> From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 11:54 PM
>
> On Wed, 11 May 2016 06:29:06 +
> "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
>
> > > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 11:05 PM
> > >
> > > On Thu, 5 M
On Wed, 11 May 2016 06:29:06 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> > From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 11:05 PM
> >
> > On Thu, 5 May 2016 12:15:46 +
> > "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> >
> > > > From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
>
> From: Alex Williamson [mailto:alex.william...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 11:05 PM
>
> On Thu, 5 May 2016 12:15:46 +
> "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
>
> > > From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
> > > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
> > >
> > > Hi David and Kevin,
On Fri, 6 May 2016 16:35:38 +1000
Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 05/06/2016 01:05 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Thu, 5 May 2016 12:15:46 +
> > "Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> >
> >>> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
> >>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
> >>>
> >>> Hi
On 05/06/2016 01:05 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
On Thu, 5 May 2016 12:15:46 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
Hi David and Kevin,
On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote:
From: Tian, Kevin
Sent: 05 May 2016 10:
On Thu, 5 May 2016 12:15:46 +
"Tian, Kevin" wrote:
> > From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
> >
> > Hi David and Kevin,
> >
> > On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote:
> >
> > > From: Tian, Kevin
> > >> Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37
>
On 2016/5/5 20:15, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
Hi David and Kevin,
On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote:
From: Tian, Kevin
Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37
...
Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from
> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
>
> Hi David and Kevin,
>
> On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote:
>
> > From: Tian, Kevin
> >> Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37
> > ...
> >>> Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from
> >>> guest
On 2016/5/5 17:36, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 3:34 PM
On 2016/5/3 14:22, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 2:08 PM
On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie
Sent: Wednesday, A
Hi David and Kevin,
On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote:
From: Tian, Kevin
Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37
...
Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from
guest. So I think it's safe to passthrough MSI-X table if we
can make sure guest kernel would not touch MSI-X table in
normal cod
From: Tian, Kevin
> Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37
...
> > Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from
> > guest. So I think it's safe to passthrough MSI-X table if we
> > can make sure guest kernel would not touch MSI-X table in
> > normal code path such as para-virtualized guest kernel on
> From: Yongji Xie
> Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 3:34 PM
>
> On 2016/5/3 14:22, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>
> >> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 2:08 PM
> >>
> >> On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> >>
> From: Yongji Xie
> Sent: Wednesda
> From: Yongji Xie
> Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 8:43 PM
>
> This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports
> interrupt remapping which can ensure that a given pci device
> can only shoot the MSIs assigned for it.
>
> With MSI-X table mmapped, we also need to expose the
> read/
> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 2:08 PM
>
> On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>
> >> From: Yongji Xie
> >> Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 8:43 PM
> >>
> >> This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports
> >> interrupt remappi
On 2016/5/3 14:22, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyj...@linux.vnet.ibm.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 2:08 PM
On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 8:43 PM
This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports
interrupt
On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Yongji Xie
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 8:43 PM
This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports
interrupt remapping which can ensure that a given pci device
can only shoot the MSIs assigned for it.
With MSI-X table mmapped, we also n
This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports
interrupt remapping which can ensure that a given pci device
can only shoot the MSIs assigned for it.
With MSI-X table mmapped, we also need to expose the
read/write interface which will be used to access MSI-X table.
Signed-off-by: Yo
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