Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-09-02 Thread ng0
Ludovic Courtès writes: > ng0 skribis: > >> Ludovic Courtès writes: >> >>> Hi, >>> >>> ng0 skribis: >>> On the subject of git repos, I do not understand enough of the git-download.scm at the moment to add this myself, but why don't we have git-fsck in it as default? >>> >>> Dunn

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-09-02 Thread Ludovic Courtès
ng0 skribis: > Ludovic Courtès writes: > >> Hi, >> >> ng0 skribis: >> >>> On the subject of git repos, I do not understand enough of the >>> git-download.scm at the moment to add this myself, but why don't we have >>> git-fsck in it as default? >> >> Dunno; what would it add? >> >> Ludo’. > > I

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-09-02 Thread ng0
Ludovic Courtès writes: > Hi, > > ng0 skribis: > >> On the subject of git repos, I do not understand enough of the >> git-download.scm at the moment to add this myself, but why don't we have >> git-fsck in it as default? > > Dunno; what would it add? > > Ludo’. I don't understand enough of it,

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-09-01 Thread Ludovic Courtès
Hi, ng0 skribis: > On the subject of git repos, I do not understand enough of the > git-download.scm at the moment to add this myself, but why don't we have > git-fsck in it as default? Dunno; what would it add? Ludo’.

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-09-01 Thread Ludovic Courtès
Troy Sankey skribis: > Quoting Ludovic Courtès (2016-08-31 16:21:49) >> (That said, more and more software is distributed via Git rather than as >> tarballs, and most repos are unsigned; even if they were, there are >> basically no tools to meaningfully authenticate a Git checkout…) > > In that c

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread Troy Sankey
Quoting Ludovic Courtès (2016-08-31 16:21:49) > (That said, more and more software is distributed via Git rather than as > tarballs, and most repos are unsigned; even if they were, there are > basically no tools to meaningfully authenticate a Git checkout…) In that case, not all hope is lost---I'v

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread ng0
Ludovic Courtès writes: > Hi, > > Arun Isaac skribis: > >> When you are building a package from source, the Parabola build system >> verifies the GPG signature of the source archive if the developer's key >> is in your keyring. Else, it raises an error and asks you to get the >> required key man

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread Ludovic Courtès
Hi, Arun Isaac skribis: > When you are building a package from source, the Parabola build system > verifies the GPG signature of the source archive if the developer's key > is in your keyring. Else, it raises an error and asks you to get the > required key manually. There is also an option that

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread Arun Isaac
> Does Parabola have some sort of keyring that all the upstream keys go > into? Or did I misinterpret your suggestion? I'm not familiar with the > Parabola package management system. No, Parabola does not collect upstream keys into any centralized keyring. When you are building a package from so

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread Leo Famulari
On Wed, Aug 31, 2016 at 01:17:57PM +0530, Arun Isaac wrote: Alex Kost wrote: > > I think the procedure is: a packager verifies the source and that's it. > > Since a package has a hash of the source, we can be sure that the source > > wasn't changed since it was packaged, so if we find that a packag

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread ng0
Arun Isaac writes: > [ Unknown signature status ] > >> I think the procedure is: a packager verifies the source and that's it. >> Since a package has a hash of the source, we can be sure that the source >> wasn't changed since it was packaged, so if we find that a package has >> a compromised sou

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread Arun Isaac
> I think the procedure is: a packager verifies the source and that's it. > Since a package has a hash of the source, we can be sure that the source > wasn't changed since it was packaged, so if we find that a package has > a compromised source, we can blame the packager. Ah, that sounds good eno

Re: Packaging packages with GPG signed source archives

2016-08-31 Thread Alex Kost
Arun Isaac (2016-08-31 08:37 +0300) wrote: > I am trying to package a package that provides a GPG signed source > archive. Is there any way to get Guix to verify this signature, by say, > specifying it in the 'origin' object of the 'source' field of the > package? What is the standard way this is