Re: [PATCH v8 16/22] tpm2: Support authorized policy

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 04:13:17PM +0800, Gary Lin wrote: > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 10:39:45AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Tue, 2024-01-16 at 17:20 +0800, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote: > > [...] > > > (*1) https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html > > > (*2) https:/

[PATCH v9 01/22] posix_wrap: tweaks in preparation for libtasn1

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Daniel Axtens - Define SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT, it's the same as SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG. - Define WORD_BIT, the size in bits of an int. This is a defined in the Single Unix Specification and in gnulib's limits.h. gnulib assumes it's 32 bits on all our platforms, including 64 bit

[PATCH v9 00/22] Automatic Disk Unlock with TPM2

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
GIT repo for v9: https://github.com/lcp/grub2/tree/tpm2-unlock-v9 This patch series is based on "Automatic TPM Disk Unlock"(*1) posted by Hernan Gatta to introduce the key protector framework and TPM2 stack to GRUB2, and this could be a useful feature for the systems to implement full disk encrypt

[PATCH v9 16/22] tpm2: Support authorized policy

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file in TPM 2.0 Key File format. TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys. Per TPM 2.0 Key File(*1), CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyAuth

[PATCH v9 18/22] cryptodisk: Fallback to passphrase

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Patrick Colp If a protector is specified, but it fails to unlock the disk, fall back to asking for the passphrase. However, an error was set indicating that the protector(s) failed. Later code (e.g., LUKS code) fails as `grub_errno` is now set. Print the existing errors out first, before pr

[PATCH v9 20/22] diskfilter: look up cryptodisk devices first

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
When using disk auto-unlocking with TPM 2.0, the typical grub.cfg may look like this: tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm cryptomount -u -P tpm2 search --fs-uuid --set=root Since the disk search order is based on the order of module loading, the attacker cou

[PATCH v9 03/22] libtasn1: disable code not needed in grub

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Daniel Axtens We don't expect to be able to write ASN.1, only read it, so we can disable some code. Do that with #if 0/#endif, rather than deletion. This means that the difference between upstream and grub is smaller, which should make updating libtasn1 easier in the future. With these ex

[PATCH v9 04/22] libtasn1: changes for grub compatibility

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Daniel Axtens Do a few things to make libtasn1 compile as part of grub: - remove _asn1_strcat and replace strcat with the bound-checked _asn1_str_cat except the one inside _asn1_str_cat. That strcat is replaced with strcpy. - adjust header paths in libtasn1.h - adjust header pat

[PATCH v9 22/22] tests: Add tpm2_test

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
For TPM 2.0 TSS stack, the TCG2 command sending function is the only difference between the a QEMU instance and grub-emu. To test TPM key unsealing with a QEMU instance, it requires an extra OS image to invoke grub-protect to seal the LUKS key, not only a simple grub-shell rescue CD image. On the o

[PATCH v9 19/22] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend such attack, wip

[PATCH v9 15/22] tpm2: Implement more TPM2 commands

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
This commit implements a few more TPM2 commands as the preparation for the authorized policy support. * TPM2_LoadExternal This command is added to load the external public key to verify the signed policy digest * TPM2_HashSequenceStart, TPM2_SequenceUpdate, TPM2_SequenceComplete, and TPM2_Ha

[PATCH v9 13/22] tpm2: Add TPM2 types, structures, and command constants

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
Add new TPM2 types and structures as the preparation to support authorized policy. * New types: TPM_ALG_ECDAA, TPM_ALG_ECDSA, TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR, TPM_ALG_RSASSA, TPM_ALG_RSAPSS, TPM_ALG_SM2, and TPMI_ALG_SIG_SCHEME * New structures: TPMS_EMPTY, TPMS_SIGNATURE_RSA, TPMS_SIGNATURE_ECC, TPMS_

[PATCH v9 21/22] tpm2: Enable tpm2 module for grub-emu

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
As a preparation to test TPM 2.0 TSS stack with grub-emu, the new option, --tpm-device, is introduced to specify the TPM device for grub-emu so that grub-emu can share the emulated TPM device with the host. Since grub-emu can directly access the device node on host, it's easy to implement the esse

[PATCH v9 08/22] key_protector: Add key protectors framework

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Hernan Gatta A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an unlocking key for a fully-encrypted disk from a specific source. A key protector module registers itself with the key protectors framework when it is loaded and unregisters when unloaded. Additionally, a key protector ma

[PATCH v9 10/22] key_protector: Add TPM2 Key Protector

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Hernan Gatta The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0. The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable defaults. On

[PATCH v9 12/22] util/grub-protect: Add new tool

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Hernan Gatta To utilize the key protectors framework, there must be a way to protect full-disk encryption keys in the first place. The grub-protect tool includes support for the TPM2 key protector but other protectors that require setup ahead of time can be supported in the future. For the

[PATCH v9 17/22] tpm2: Implement NV index

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Patrick Colp Currently with the TPM2 protector, only SRK mode is supported and NV index support is just a stub. Implement the NV index option. Note: This only extends support on the unseal path. grub2_protect has not been updated. tpm2-tools can be used to insert a key into the NV index.

[PATCH v9 05/22] libtasn1: compile into asn1 module

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Daniel Axtens Create a wrapper file that specifies the module license. Set up the makefile so it is built. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens Signed-off-by: Gary Lin Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko --- grub-core/Makefile.core.def| 15 +++ grub-core/lib/libtasn1_wrap/wrap

[PATCH v9 09/22] tpm2: Add TPM Software Stack (TSS)

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Hernan Gatta A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Software Stack (TSS) provides logic to compose, submit, and parse TPM commands and responses. A limited number of TPM commands may be accessed via the EFI TCG2 protocol. This protocol exposes functionality that is primarily geared toward TPM usa

[PATCH v9 14/22] tpm2: Add more marshal/unmarshal functions

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
Add a few more marshal/unmarshal functions to support authorized policy. * Marshal: grub_tpm2_mu_TPMU_SENSITIVE_COMPOSITE_Marshal() grub_tpm2_mu_TPMT_SENSITIVE_Marshal() grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_SENSITIVE_Marshal() grub_tpm2_mu_TPMS_SIGNATURE_RSA_Marshal() grub_tpm2_mu_TPMS_SIGNATURE_ECC_Marsh

[PATCH v9 11/22] cryptodisk: Support key protectors

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
From: Hernan Gatta Add a new parameter to cryptomount to support the key protectors framework: -P. The parameter is used to automatically retrieve a key from specified key protectors. The parameter may be repeated to specify any number of key protectors. These are tried in order until one provide

[PATCH v9 07/22] libtasn1: Add the documentation

2024-02-04 Thread Gary Lin via Grub-devel
Document libtasn1 in docs/grub-dev.texi and add the upgrade steps. Also add the patches to make libtasn1 compatible with grub code. Signed-off-by: Gary Lin Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko --- docs/grub-dev.texi| 27 ++ ...asn1-disable-code-not-needed-in-grub.patch