Quoting Mate Kukri (2023-12-08 18:20:12)
> 154dcb1aea9f8fc42b2bce98bebed004d7783a7d broke out of tree builds by
> introducing the extra_deps.lst file into the source tree but referencing
> it just by name in grub-core/Makefile.am.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri
> ---
> grub-core/Makefile.am | 4 ++
Quoting Julian Andres Klode (2023-12-08 18:29:52)
> On Fri, Dec 08, 2023 at 01:20:37PM +0100, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 06, 2023 at 05:39:53PM +0100, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > > On Wed, Dec 06, 2023 at 04:39:29PM +0100, Olaf Hering wrote:
> > > > Wed, 6 Dec 2023 16:24:53 +0100 Daniel Kiper
According to the ACPI specification, the Entry field of XSDT containsts an
array of 64-bit physical addresses that point to other DESCRIPTION_HEADERs.
But entry_ptr is defined as a 32-bit pointer, which result in mistakenly
treating each 64-bit length address as two 32-bit length addresses when
ite
On Fri, Dec 08, 2023 at 04:57:55PM +, Mate Kukri wrote:
> The previous grub-install patch delaying the copying of files caused a
> regression when installing without an existing directory structure.
>
> This patch ensures that the platform directory actually exists by the
> time the code tries
On Mon, Dec 11, 2023 at 12:23:05AM -0800, Oliver Steffen wrote:
> Quoting Mate Kukri (2023-12-08 18:20:12)
> > 154dcb1aea9f8fc42b2bce98bebed004d7783a7d broke out of tree builds by
> > introducing the extra_deps.lst file into the source tree but referencing
> > it just by name in grub-core/Makefile.
On Wed, Dec 06, 2023 at 11:42:02AM +0800, Michael Chang via Grub-devel wrote:
> Enclosed is the description from openSUSE bugzilla entry:
>
> While working on reproducible builds for openSUSE, I found that our
> grub2 package's /usr/share/grub2/x86_64-xen/grub.xen varies across
> builds.
>
> I iden
Generating the canary at build time allows the canary to be different for
every build which could limit the effectiveness of certain exploits.
Fallback to the statically generated random bytes if /dev/urandom is not
readable (eg. Windows).
Reduce the canary to 3 bytes with a NULL upper byte on 32-
This series extends and improves the previous patch initializing the
stack guard canary. The first patch improves the previous patch by
setting the most significant byte to NULL, which will filter out
string buffer overflow attacks. The second patch allows creation of
the canary at build time from
Having randomly generated bytes in the binary output breaks reproducible
builds. Since build timestamps are usually the source of irreproducibility
there is a standard which defines an environment variable SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
to be used when set for build timestamps. According to the standard[1], the
The canary, __stack_chk_guard, is in the BSS and so will get initialized to
zero if it is not explicitly initialized. If the UEFI firmware does not
support the RNG protocol, then the canary will not be randomized and will
be zero. This seems like a possibly easier value to write by an attacker.
Ini
On Sun, Dec 10, 2023 at 11:47:07PM +0100, Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko wrote:
> This patch series fixes compilation problems and one boot bug for different
> BSD
> platforms. Mostly they are safe and touch files which are not used by Linux
For all patches Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper ...
I will pu
On Mon, Dec 11, 2023 at 05:20:25PM +0800, Qiumiao Zhang via Grub-devel wrote:
> According to the ACPI specification, the Entry field of XSDT containsts an
> array of 64-bit physical addresses that point to other DESCRIPTION_HEADERs.
> But entry_ptr is defined as a 32-bit pointer, which result in mi
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