On 11/30/23 00:45, Daniel Kiper wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 06:07:42PM +0530, Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya wrote:
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya
---
grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c | 11 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275
On Sat, Jan 6, 2024 at 6:38 PM Pascal Hambourg wrote:
>
> If Windows Vista, Seven and Server 2008 do not need drivemap,
> then later versions using bootmgr too should not need it either.
>
> Note:
> This patch checks Windows versions up to 19 because distinguishing 20
> from 2000 requires more com
> onstr="$(gettext_printf "(on %s)" "${DEVICE}")"
> cat << EOF
> +if [ "\$grub_platform" != "efi" ]; then
This is not the right check. Only "pc" platform supports chainloadin
boot sector. All other: coreboot, qemu, emu, ieee1275, xen and
non-x86. The only one which might is xen_p
Looks good. A small comment inline
> diff --git a/grub-core/kern/main.c b/grub-core/kern/main.c
> index 731c07c29..5db504e6e 100644
> --- a/grub-core/kern/main.c
> +++ b/grub-core/kern/main.c
> @@ -265,6 +265,11 @@ reclaim_module_space (void)
> void __attribute__ ((noreturn))
> grub_main (void)
On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 11:34 AM Michael Chang via Grub-devel
wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 05:58:02PM +0100, Itxaka serrano wrote:
> > Hey all,
> >
> > I opened a bug because this behaviour doesnt seem correct to me:
> >
> > https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?65154
> >
> >
> > Example:
> >
> > g
Any strong reason to have it in kernel? It doesn't seem to be
necessary in non-crypto cases. Separate module or cryptodisk looks
like better places
On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 12:22 PM Gary Lin via Grub-devel
wrote:
>
> From: Hernan Gatta
>
> A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an
LGTM for doc. Patches reviewed separately
On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 12:23 PM Gary Lin via Grub-devel
wrote:
>
> Document libtasn1 in docs/grub-dev.texi and add the upgrade steps.
> Also add the patches to make libtasn1 compatible with grub code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin
> ---
> docs/grub-dev.t
On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 12:23 PM Gary Lin via Grub-devel
wrote:
>
> From: Daniel Axtens
>
> Do a few things to make libtasn1 compile as part of grub:
>
> - redefine _asn1_strcat. grub removed strcat so replace it with the
>appropriate calls to memcpy and strlen. Use this internally where
>
LGTM
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko
Le mar. 16 janv. 2024, 12:22, Gary Lin via Grub-devel
a écrit :
> From: Daniel Axtens
>
> Create a wrapper file that specifies the module license.
> Set up the makefile so it is built.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens
> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin
> ---
> g
I would suggest something a bit more descriptive than if 0. What about
#ifdef GRUB_SKIPPED_IMPORTING ?
Le mar. 16 janv. 2024, 12:24, Gary Lin via Grub-devel
a écrit :
> From: Daniel Axtens
>
> We don't expect to be able to write ASN.1, only read it,
> so we can disable some code.
>
> Do that wi
LGTM
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko
On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 12:22 PM Gary Lin via Grub-devel
wrote:
>
> From: Daniel Axtens
>
> - Define SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT, it's the same as
>SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG.
>
> - Define WORD_BIT, the size in bits of an int. This is a defined
>in the Sin
On Tue, 2024-01-16 at 17:20 +0800, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
[...]
> (*1) https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
> (*2) https://github.com/okirch/pcr-oracle
Just a curiosity question, but have you tested the interoperability of
pcr-oracle keys? It looks like you got
Hi!
On Sun, Jan 14, 2024 at 03:58:42PM +0800, Xinhui Yang via Grub-devel wrote:
>
>Recently we observed a strange failure while packaging GRUB 2.12 for
>our distro. The translation file generation process might fail if
>parallelism was enabled (e.g. `make -j', or with `-j16' and larger
>numbers).
When using disk auto-unlocking with TPM 2.0, the typical grub.cfg may
look like this:
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u -P tpm2
search --fs-uuid --set=root
Since the disk search order is based on the order of module loading, the
attacker cou
From: Daniel Axtens
We don't expect to be able to write ASN.1, only read it,
so we can disable some code.
Do that with #if 0/#endif, rather than deletion. This means
that the difference between upstream and grub is smaller,
which should make updating libtasn1 easier in the future.
With these ex
For TPM 2.0 TSS stack, the TCG2 command sending function is the only
difference between the a QEMU instance and grub-emu. To test TPM key
unsealing with a QEMU instance, it requires an extra OS image to invoke
grub-protect to seal the LUKS key, not only a simple grub-shell rescue
CD image. On the o
From: Hernan Gatta
The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval
of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0.
The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various
arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable
defaults. On
From: Patrick Colp
If a protector is specified, but it fails to unlock the disk, fall back
to asking for the passphrase. However, an error was set indicating that
the protector(s) failed. Later code (e.g., LUKS code) fails as
`grub_errno` is now set. Print the existing errors out first, before
pr
Document libtasn1 in docs/grub-dev.texi and add the upgrade steps.
Also add the patches to make libtasn1 compatible with grub code.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin
---
docs/grub-dev.texi| 27 ++
...asn1-disable-code-not-needed-in-grub.patch | 311 ++
...tasn1
From: Daniel Axtens
Do a few things to make libtasn1 compile as part of grub:
- redefine _asn1_strcat. grub removed strcat so replace it with the
appropriate calls to memcpy and strlen. Use this internally where
strcat was used.
- replace c_isdigit with grub_isdigit (and don't import c-
As a preparation to test TPM 2.0 TSS stack with grub-emu, the new
option, --tpm-device, is introduced to specify the TPM device for
grub-emu so that grub-emu can share the emulated TPM device with
the host.
Since grub-emu can directly access the device node on host, it's easy to
implement the esse
From: Hernan Gatta
To utilize the key protectors framework, there must be a way to protect
full-disk encryption keys in the first place. The grub-protect tool
includes support for the TPM2 key protector but other protectors that
require setup ahead of time can be supported in the future.
For the
Add a few more marshal/unmarshal functions to support authorized policy.
* Marshal:
grub_tpm2_mu_TPMU_SENSITIVE_COMPOSITE_Marshal()
grub_tpm2_mu_TPMT_SENSITIVE_Marshal()
grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_SENSITIVE_Marshal()
grub_tpm2_mu_TPMS_SIGNATURE_RSA_Marshal()
grub_tpm2_mu_TPMS_SIGNATURE_ECC_Marsh
From: Hernan Gatta
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Software Stack (TSS) provides logic to
compose, submit, and parse TPM commands and responses.
A limited number of TPM commands may be accessed via the EFI TCG2
protocol. This protocol exposes functionality that is primarily geared
toward TPM usa
This commit implements a few more TPM2 commands as the preparation for
the authorized policy support.
* TPM2_LoadExternal
This command is added to load the external public key to verify the
signed policy digest
* TPM2_HashSequenceStart, TPM2_SequenceUpdate, TPM2_SequenceComplete,
and TPM2_Ha
This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file
in TPM 2.0 Key File format.
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized
policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys.
Per TPM 2.0 Key File(*1), CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyAuth
An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and
trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key
protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so
the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend
such attack, wip
From: Patrick Colp
Currently with the TPM2 protector, only SRK mode is supported and
NV index support is just a stub. Implement the NV index option.
Note: This only extends support on the unseal path. grub2_protect
has not been updated. tpm2-tools can be used to insert a key into
the NV index.
GIT repo for v8: https://github.com/lcp/grub2/tree/tpm2-unlock-v8
This patch series is based on "Automatic TPM Disk Unlock"(*1) posted by
Hernan Gatta to introduce the key protector framework and TPM2 stack
to GRUB2, and this could be a useful feature for the systems to
implement full disk encrypt
From: Hernan Gatta
Add a new parameter to cryptomount to support the key protectors framework: -P.
The parameter is used to automatically retrieve a key from specified key
protectors. The parameter may be repeated to specify any number of key
protectors. These are tried in order until one provide
Add new TPM2 types and structures as the preparation to support
authorized policy.
* New types:
TPM_ALG_ECDAA, TPM_ALG_ECDSA, TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR, TPM_ALG_RSASSA,
TPM_ALG_RSAPSS, TPM_ALG_SM2, and TPMI_ALG_SIG_SCHEME
* New structures:
TPMS_EMPTY, TPMS_SIGNATURE_RSA, TPMS_SIGNATURE_ECC,
TPMS_
From: Hernan Gatta
A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an unlocking key
for a fully-encrypted disk from a specific source. A key protector
module registers itself with the key protectors framework when it is
loaded and unregisters when unloaded. Additionally, a key protector ma
From: Daniel Axtens
Create a wrapper file that specifies the module license.
Set up the makefile so it is built.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin
---
grub-core/Makefile.core.def| 15 +++
grub-core/lib/libtasn1_wrap/wrap.c | 26 ++
From: Daniel Axtens
- Define SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT, it's the same as
SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG.
- Define WORD_BIT, the size in bits of an int. This is a defined
in the Single Unix Specification and in gnulib's limits.h. gnulib
assumes it's 32 bits on all our platforms, including 64 bit
On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 05:58:02PM +0100, Itxaka serrano wrote:
> Hey all,
>
> I opened a bug because this behaviour doesnt seem correct to me:
>
> https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?65154
>
>
> Example:
>
> grub> hello
> error: ../../grub-core/script/function.c:119:can't find command `hello'.
> g
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