Re: [go-nuts] Security implications of exposed Go runtime anon pipes

2025-01-09 Thread 'TheDiveO' via golang-nuts
On Linux, you can interfere with any process via the process filesystem typically mounted at /proc in several creative ways, given you have access rights to a particular process. CAP_SYS_PTRACE isn't just for the ptrace syscall, but also for access inside /proc. The open file descriptors of Lin

Re: [go-nuts] Security implications of exposed Go runtime anon pipes

2025-01-09 Thread Ian Lance Taylor
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 10:22 AM Moritz Sanft wrote: > > Thanks for your swift response. Let me clarify some things that I didn't seem > to convey well in my initial question. > > Probably the most important; I'm not looking to disclose a vulnerability in > Go here. If I was to disclose that, I w

Re: [go-nuts] Security implications of exposed Go runtime anon pipes

2025-01-09 Thread Moritz Sanft
Hey Ian! Thanks for your swift response. Let me clarify some things that I didn't seem to convey well in my initial question. Probably the most important; I'm not looking to disclose a vulnerability in Go here. If I was to disclose that, I would use the points of contact you've mentioned. I'm

Re: [go-nuts] Security implications of exposed Go runtime anon pipes

2025-01-09 Thread Ian Lance Taylor
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 9:16 AM Moritz Sanft wrote: > > I've recently came across a Go application with an arbitrary file write > vulnerability restricted to `/proc/self`. After researching for a little, > I've found the following article which exploits such a vulnerability in a > NodeJS applica

[go-nuts] Security implications of exposed Go runtime anon pipes

2025-01-09 Thread Moritz Sanft
Hey there! I've recently came across a Go application with an arbitrary file write vulnerability restricted to `/proc/self`. After researching for a little, I've found the following article which exploits such a vulnerability in a NodeJS application, escalating it into remote code execution by