> This bugs me because I'm working on the console and have to move my
> fingers from the keyboard to my mouse (or whatever) to enter the pin
> into the X widget instead of console!
Actually, the graphical pinentry should capture the keyboard focus and
thus make it unnecessary to use the mouse in t
> If anyone knows of other free implementations, i'd be happy to hear
> about them too.
cryptlib.
mo
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GPGME's API is documented in the info manual, which is part of the GPGME
package.
Thanks,
Moritz
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> Can I use a USB instead of a Smart Card?
Without further context this question does not make too much sense. USB
sticks (i guess that is what you mean) are completely different from
smartcards when it comes to security solutions.
Surely it is possible to e.g. store secret keys on a USB stick a
> 1. Is it possible to have only one key pair (public & secret pref. DSA) that
> can be used for both GPG & OpenSSH? (as a sys admin of some interest in
> cryptography, this is an important question)
Uhm, possible... sure, why not. I just don't know right now how one
would achive that.
> 2.
> Any other thoughts??
More or less. But it requires some hacking. SCDaemon allows for
signalling in case of certain events, including card removal. One
approach would be: write a small daemon, which connects to SCDaemon and
waits for the card-removal event. Let that daemon execute a
user-defi
Poldi 0.4 has been released. Poldi is our PAM module, which implements
authentication through the OpenPGP smartcard.
It can be fetched from:
ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/poldi/poldi-0.4.tar.bz2
ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/poldi/poldi-0.4.tar.bz2.asc
Changes since version 0.3 are:
* Man
Hi,
> But there is a problem with kdesu. It only works when the PIN of my card
> is already cached.
I cannot really see right now, what's wrong in respect to kdesu. But it
needs to be debugged of course.
Please add to your poldi.conf file something like:
# Specify the log file:
log-file /h
> the latter cannot be attacked without the keypair and the
> passphrase,
Keep in mind that we are talking about a hybrid crypto system. Your
hidden assumption seems to be that the session key which is generated
during encryption to a public key is not worth attacking. Then, nothing
prevents you
> Is it true to say then,
> that if you wanted someone to be able to decrypt a
> (symmetrically encrypted) file, they'd need to know the algorithm used,
> the key and they'd also have to use the same program to decrypt as used
> to encrypt the file?
Not quite. In general: you shouldn't base the se
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