On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 12:31:53PM -0800, Rex Kneisley wrote:
> Gracious reply:
> >Install the pkg-config package:
> >apt-get install pkg-config
> >Shalom-Salam,
> >Werner
>
> Thank you!
> After installing pkg-config as suggested,
> Looks like I'm down to the wire:
>
> checking whether mlock is
I know some encryption schemes reveal more information about the keys used
when an attacker has both the plaintext and the ciphertext. In general,
how much information does GPG reveal in such situations?
How much plaintext/ciphertext matched data would an attacker need (An order
of magnitude is fi
Am 21.11.2014 um 10:57 schrieb Schlacta, Christ:
> I know some encryption schemes reveal more information about the keys used
> when an attacker has both the plaintext and the ciphertext. In general,
> how much information does GPG reveal in such situations?
Short answer: Thats no problem.
google
I know some encryption schemes reveal more information about the keys
used when an attacker has both the plaintext and the ciphertext. In
general, how much information does GPG reveal in such situations?
Virtually none.
How much plaintext/ciphertext matched data would an attacker need (An
i know its not strictly for this list but does anybody have a suggestion
for the zone file ?
i have 2 TLSA RRs in my zone file, 2 certs, and postfix automatically
selects the correct cert based on the RR
what would gnupg do if it encountered 2 pka RRs ?
would it select the correct finger print a
On 11/21/2014 at 4:57 AM, "Christ Schlacta" wrote:
>how much information does GPG reveal in such situations?
=
GnuPG works by using hybrid encryption:
[1] The plaintext is converted to ciphertext using a block cipher, with GnuPG
generating a random session key for the encryption
[2] The
It's really easy to point fingers at them and say, "man, what
chumps." But the reality is none of us on this list are different
than they are. We're human, with the same foibles and weaknesses, and
I'm pretty sure Robin Sage would rip through this mailing list like a
chainsaw.
For that matter, E
So to summarize, the best way to try this attack would be to encrypt lots
of small messages to a dummy key and a target key because the only knowable
plaintext is the session key. However, there's no known or reasonably
suspected method of plaintext attack anyway, so all this data is believed
to be
On 11/21/2014 at 1:01 PM, "Christ Schlacta" wrote:
>
>So to summarize, the best way to try this attack would be to
>encrypt lots
>of small messages to a dummy key and a target key because the only
>knowable
>plaintext is the session key. However, there's no known or
>reasonably
>suspected metho
Only I use the two machines, but need the file encrypted.
Any alternatives to symmetrical encryption of a file?
Not really. Sym would appear to be ideal for your use case.
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/ma
Thanks Robert. I'll give it a try.
regards Dave P
On 21 November 2014 18:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Only I use the two machines, but need the file encrypted.
>>
>> Any alternatives to symmetrical encryption of a file?
>
>
> Not really. Sym would appear to be ideal for your use case.
>
>
> _
For a password safe you might look into existing solutions, such as
keepass(x) or other similar password storage solutions
On Nov 21, 2014 10:29 AM, "Dave Pawson" wrote:
> Thanks Robert. I'll give it a try.
>
> regards Dave P
>
> On 21 November 2014 18:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >> Only I use
1. A matter of trust (low)
2. One mc is Linux, the other windows - they tend not to mix?
Tks, Dave
On 21 November 2014 18:36, Schlacta, Christ wrote:
> For a password safe you might look into existing solutions, such as
> keepass(x) or other similar password storage solutions
>
> On Nov 21, 2014
What is this param's correct usage:
"throw-keyids" or "throw-keyid"
?
I see conflicting docs online:
https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/GPG-Esoteric-Options.html &
--throw-keyids
--no-throw-keyids
Do not put th
Am Fr 21.11.2014, 12:16:39 schrieb grantksupp...@operamail.com:
> I see conflicting docs online:
> Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages.
This
> helps to hide the receivers of the message and is a limited
> countermeasure against traffic analysis.1 On the rec
> And what do you consider the conflict?
>> What is this param's correct usage:
>>
>> "throw-keyids" or "throw-keyid"
>>
>> ?
The obvious difference in usage ...
One says the usage is
throw-keyids
the other says usage is
throw-keyid
neither one mentions the others' usage
On 11/21/2014 04:58 PM, grantksupp...@operamail.com wrote:
> The obvious difference in usage ...
>
> One says the usage is
>
> throw-keyids
>
> the other says usage is
>
> throw-keyid
>
> neither one mentions the others' usage
As long as the prefix substring is unique, gpg will accept a
On Fri, Nov 21, 2014, at 02:33 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> As long as the prefix substring is unique, gpg will accept a truncated
> long-option.
>
> That is, the full option is --throw-keyids, but gpg will accept
> --throw-keyid as an alias for it.
>
> It should also accept --throw-keyi an
Am Fr 21.11.2014, 13:58:19 schrieb grantksupp...@operamail.com:
> The obvious difference in usage ...
>
> One says the usage is
>
> throw-keyids
>
> the other says usage is
>
> throw-keyid
That's just a typo. The correct name for the option is "throw-keyids".
You do not have to write the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 11/20/14 10:40 AM, Dave Pawson wrote:
| Requirement. Two machines (one Linux, one Windows).
|
| I want a secure file 'shared' between them, as a pwd-safe.
|
| Only I use the two machines, but need the file encrypted.
|
| Any alternatives to symme
On Thursday 20 November 2014 14:36:35 Schlacta, Christ wrote:
> On Nov 20, 2014 1:58 PM, "Ingo Klöcker" wrote:
> > On Tuesday 18 November 2014 22:43:18 MFPA wrote:
> > KMail encrypts an individual copy for each BCC recipient. I thought
> > Thunderbird+Enigmail would also do this.
> >
> > Any mail
On Nov 21, 2014 8:55 PM, "Ingo Klöcker" wrote:
>
> On Thursday 20 November 2014 14:36:35 Schlacta, Christ wrote:
> > On Nov 20, 2014 1:58 PM, "Ingo Klöcker" wrote:
> > > On Tuesday 18 November 2014 22:43:18 MFPA wrote:
> > > KMail encrypts an individual copy for each BCC recipient. I thought
> >
Thanks Doug
On 22 November 2014 02:37, Doug Barton wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> Either symmetric or PK encryption would suit your needs, but as
> someone pointed out already, a better solution is to use a password safe.
>
> KeePass is an excellent solution, and
I installed keepassx. Not much use to me.
1. Illegible with my eyesight (reported to them)
2. Insufficient fields (seems to be non expandable).
regards
On 22 November 2014 02:37, Doug Barton wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 11/20/14 10:40 AM, Dave Pawson wrote:
>
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