On Fri, 15 Aug 2014 13:10, andreas.schwier...@cardcontact.de said:
> So what is that assumption based on ? If you are using a hardware device
> that is certified as Secure Signature Creation Device under the Common
> Criteria scheme, then the quality of the random number generation is an
> importa
On 15/08/14 22:33, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> You'll notice I'm not disagreeing with you on anything. :)
Hehe :).
I do regret the swearing in the last paragraph though. That wasn't
necessary.
My apologies to anyone who didn't appreciate that.
Peter.
--
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in c
Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this.
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/whats-matter-with-pgp.html
Regards,
Chambers
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On 2014-08-16 at 19:14, Kristy Chambers wrote:
> Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this.
> http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/whats-matter-with-pgp.html
Yeah, PGP’s what I’d call something coming with and for the “old”
Internet, the slow, federated, cleartext, client–s
On 8/16/2014 1:14 PM, Kristy Chambers wrote:
> Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this.
Meh. Color me unimpressed.
* "PGP keys suck." No, asymmetric key infrastructure sucks in general.
OpenPGP provides no infrastructure, only tools with which to build
infrastructure. If your
On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 12:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 8/16/2014 1:14 PM, Kristy Chambers wrote:
>> Sorry for that crap subject. I just want to leave this.
>
> Meh. Color me unimpressed.
This was a terrific post. Thank you, Robert.
[snip]
> * "No forward secrecy." Not everyone needs
On 2014-08-17 at 01:41, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 12:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen
> wrote:
>> OpenPGP's biggest problem, BTW, which goes *completely unmentioned* in
>> this blogpost: OpenPGP can't protect your metadata, and that turns out
>> to often be higher-value content than y
On 8/16/2014 7:41 PM, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> There are 25 years invested in making PGP work. Many subtle bugs and
> security errors in the protocol and the gnupg implementation have been
> worked out. Throwing out PGP would be a bit like making this
> mistake:
More or less, yeah. Someday I'm go