Re: Smart card reader security

2013-10-18 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 17 Oct 2013 17:55, christian.we...@gmail.com said: > I bought a cyberJack go [1] to use it with my openPGP smart card for > authentification. Since the firmware of that device is upgradeable and > is capable of saving atleast 2 GB of data, how can I be sure it is not a This is not just a

Re: Differences in --list-packets between 1.4 and 2.0

2013-10-18 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 17 Oct 2013 21:26, r...@sixdemonbag.org said: > Is there any way to make GnuPG 1.4 behave like 2.0 in this regard? Yes. See commit 0bdf121 which will be included into 1.4.16. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___

Re: trust your corporation for keyowner identification?

2013-10-18 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 18/10/13 08:41, Werewolf wrote: > Now what if the Company/HR department had a Notary public, for their > documents, and this same Notary had a gpg key he/she treated same his/her > stamp equipment, and used the same standards before signing a gpgkey? Then you could simply sign the notary's key

Re: trust your corporation for keyowner identification?

2013-10-18 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 18/10/13 11:37, Peter Lebbing wrote: > The moral: I think it is a really bad idea to sign keys because you trust > already made signatures. That's what your trust database is for, use that. You > should sign keys because you verified the identity *outside* the Web of Trust. However, here an int

Re: trust your corporation for keyowner identification?

2013-10-18 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 10/18/2013 2:41 AM, Werewolf wrote: > Now what if the Company/HR department had a Notary public, for their > documents, and this same Notary had a gpg key he/she treated same > his/her stamp equipment, and used the same standards before signing a > gpgkey? Forgive a nonanswer here, but this isn

Re: trust your corporation for keyowner identification?

2013-10-18 Thread Brian J. Murrell
On 13-10-18 05:59 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > > However, here an interesting dichotomy surfaces: the scenario the OP painted > was > that the HR person or notary did not use OpenPGP or key signatures, but that > you > still rely on the identity verification done by the HR person. That's correct.