Thanks for replying again. Yes, I read Schneier's paper, which is why I am
confident that even the original attack scenario on a vulnerable implementation
would not apply to the use case I was originally concerned about after seeing
mention of a "security glitch," namely encrypted local file sto
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi,
Can I use my openPGP smartcard to decrypt a file with a empty keyring ?
Assuming the card's public keys are lost or unreachable at the time.
Regards.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: APG v1.0.8
iQIVAwUBT1CXn0y6/YZf1YOeAQpSDg//UuBx2Ydaj
Also...
I know we've both read and understand the paper, so I think we just have
a terminology discrepancy here. What is a bit confusing is using the words
encrypted vs. decrypted and ciphertext vs. cleartext when we're talking
about an attacker inserting contents into the message.
What I was tr
On Fri, 2 Mar 2012, Post Carter wrote:
. . . so I think we just have a terminology discrepancy
here. What is a bit confusing is using the words encrypted
vs. decrypted and ciphertext vs. cleartext when we're talking
about an attacker inserting contents into the message.
I have been reading t
On Fri, Mar 02, 2012 at 04:55:23AM -0800, Post Carter wrote:
> 3) Next, the recipient "decrypts" the message. Since at its lowest level
> the encryption amounts to XOR'ing the message text against the secret
> key, it essentially results in the flipping of each class of text. "C"
> becomes "P" and
