Jean-David Beyer wrote:
Is it because you think they have so much computer power at Ft. Meade that
they can use exhaustive search? Or do you think their mathematicians
are so
much better than the general public (including math professors who
specialize in this stuff) that they have discovered
David Shaw wrote:
It's a countermeasure against an attack against signing subkeys.
Basically, the primary key signs all subkeys. With backsigs, the
signing subkey also signs the primary key.
Without this, an attacker can "steal" a signing subkey from someone
else and try and pretend that a sig
On Sun, Nov 06, 2005 at 09:54:01PM +0100, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
>
> >>It's a countermeasure against an attack against signing subkeys.
> >>Basically, the primary key signs all subkeys. With backsigs, the
> >>signing subkey also signs the primary key.
> >>
> >>Without
John W. Moore III wrote:
>Perhaps he believes TRANSLTR actually exists.
According to that book, it could only crack 64 bit ciphers. No big deal,
distributed.net did that too and all symmetric ciphers in pgp/gpg are
at least 128 bits.
--
ir. J.C.A. Wevers // Physics and science fiction
markus reichelt wrote:
>I put the speculations aside and stick with the fact that the NSA
>recommends ECC for government use. That's enough for _me_.
What makes you think the NSA doesn't want to decrypt US government
traffic?
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ir. J.C.A. Wevers // Physics and science fiction site:
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