On 12/07/14 22:33, Michael Anders wrote:
> I think we are in danger of working with different concepts of what
> "not being able to" means.
The scenario painted is this:
The primary key is used for creating new UIDs and certifying other
people's keys.
The subkeys are used for signing data and me
> >Please can you elaborate on how it is incorrect to say that somebody
> >who knows the passphrase to a secret key can make changes to that key.
> >Would this maybe be the case when using an encryption subkey with an
> >offline main key?
>
> If you make encryption and signing subkeys you can exp
"Paul R. Ramer" writes:
> On July 9, 2014 11:40:06 AM PDT, MFPA
> <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net> wrote:
>>-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>>Hash: SHA512
>>
>>Hi
>>
>>
>>On Wednesday 9 July 2014 at 5:54:36 PM, in
>>, Hauke Laging wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Am Di 08.07.2014, 14:41:36 schrieb J
On July 9, 2014 11:40:06 AM PDT, MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net>
wrote:
>-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>Hash: SHA512
>
>Hi
>
>
>On Wednesday 9 July 2014 at 5:54:36 PM, in
>, Hauke Laging wrote:
>
>
>> Am Di 08.07.2014, 14:41:36 schrieb J. David Boyd:
>>> which means that any of
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Wednesday 9 July 2014 at 5:54:36 PM, in
, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Di 08.07.2014, 14:41:36 schrieb J. David Boyd:
>> which means that any of them can make changes to your
>> keys.
> And that is wrong.
Please can you elaborate on how it is
Depending on how many users are expected to have access to this file, you
can just maintain a public keyring that everyone has. You then have
everyone encrypt to the list of everyone, and then anyone can decrypt it
with their private key and password and re encrypt to everyone. This
solution scal
Am Di 08.07.2014, 14:41:36 schrieb J. David Boyd:
> The problem is that all the 'users' will have to know the
> pass phrase to the secret key to be able to crypt/decrypt,
That is right.
> which
> means that any of them can make changes to your keys.
And that is wrong.
Hauke
--
Crypto für al
"Gould, Michael (RIS-BCT)" writes:
> Currently we use do not use pgp for email, only to decrypt and/or
> encrypt customer files for processing. We currently use a single user
> id for this however this doesn’t allow us to audit the use. What I was
> wondering is can I create a public key that has
Currently we use do not use pgp for email, only to decrypt and/or encrypt
customer files for processing. We currently use a single user id for this
however this doesn't allow us to audit the use. What I was wondering is can I
create a public key that has everyone's email address in it that sho
On 03/01/14 14:31, Dan Mahoney, System Admin wrote:
> Hauke, in your posts, you mention that the pinentry protocol isn't on the GPG
> website. Could that please be fixed by the people who maintain the project?
> I
> notice it also missing from http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/
I remem
On Fri, 3 Jan 2014, Hauke Laging wrote:
Am Fr 03.01.2014, 01:14:22 schrieb Dan Mahoney, System Admin:
It basically works perfectly with gpg1, where I can get an inline
prompt for a password, but gpg2 falls short where it tries to set up
some kind of a unix-socket connection to a pinentry dialo
On Fri, 3 Jan 2014, Hauke Laging wrote:
Am Fr 03.01.2014, 01:14:22 schrieb Dan Mahoney, System Admin:
It basically works perfectly with gpg1, where I can get an inline
prompt for a password, but gpg2 falls short where it tries to set up
some kind of a unix-socket connection to a pinentry dialo
Am Fr 03.01.2014, 01:14:22 schrieb Dan Mahoney, System Admin:
> It basically works perfectly with gpg1, where I can get an inline
> prompt for a password, but gpg2 falls short where it tries to set up
> some kind of a unix-socket connection to a pinentry dialog, and this
> all falls apart within t
All,
I have a script that I use to send mail (as part of pine/alpine) that
needs to prompt for my key passphrase.
I run alpine on a private unix server, within a screen session.
It basically works perfectly with gpg1, where I can get an inline prompt
for a password, but gpg2 falls short wher
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