On 10/5/2012 4:28 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
> I don't think there are any collisions for SHA-1 published
The first SHA-1 collisions were published in 2005, somewhere in there.
A team at Shengdong University discovered them.
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On Friday 05 of October 2012 01:13:54 Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Do 04.10.2012, 22:09:27 schrieb Hubert Kario:
> > won't the answer to that depend on the hash in question?
>
> Probably. So the question could be changed to: For which hashes does the
> value change and for which not? Limited to the ha
Am Do 04.10.2012, 22:09:27 schrieb Hubert Kario:
> won't the answer to that depend on the hash in question?
Probably. So the question could be changed to: For which hashes does the value
change and for which not? Limited to the hashes relevant for GnuPG operation.
Is different data with the same
Am Do 04.10.2012, 10:51:57 schrieb spam man:
> So the question is...
>
> 1.) I have two different messages that have the same hash value (a
> collision).
>hash("foo") = abcdefg
>hash("bar") = abcdefg
>
> 2.) Now you want to append identical new data to the messages and see i
On Thursday 04 of October 2012 10:51:57 spam man wrote:
> So the question is...
>
> 1.) I have two different messages that have the same hash value (a
> collision).
>hash("foo") = abcdefg
>hash("bar") = abcdefg
>
> 2.) Now you want to append identical new data to the messa
So the question is...
1.) I have two different messages that have the same hash value (a
collision).
hash("foo") = abcdefg
hash("bar") = abcdefg
2.) Now you want to append identical new data to the messages and see if
the new hashes would still be collisions?
hash(
Am Mo 24.09.2012, 19:06:17 schrieb Hauke Laging:
Oh no – I am responding to my own email...
> Given the much bigger difficulty of preimage attacks, would a rule make
> sense not to sign a document that someone else has created (and thus been
> given the opportunity for a collision attack)? The so
Hello,
not a GnuPG specific problem but perhaps relevant to GnuPG users.
Given the much bigger difficulty of preimage attacks, would a rule make sense
not to sign a document that someone else has created (and thus been given the
opportunity for a collision attack)? The solution would be to change
